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In this Article, Professor Coombs argues that the debate about
same-sex marriage has wrongfully ignored transgendered peo-
ple and their relationships. She provides an overview of argu-
ments made by opponents of same-sex marriage, such as
tradition, procreation, child-rearing, and family values. She
then examines cases involving transsexual marriages and uses
this analysis to deconstruct the same-sex marriage debate.
Professor Coombs argues that an honest consideration of
transgendered people and their relationships forces a re-evalu-
ation of arguments against same-sex marriage and disrupts the
gendered patriarchy on which traditional marriage rests. Mar-
riage should be seen as a relationship between two people, re-
gardless of their gender appearance, their gender roles, or the
genitalia they currently have. This view of marriage would lib-
erate not only transgendered people but also gays, lesbians,
and heterosexual women.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of same-sex marriage has become one of the
hot socio-cultural topics in recent years. The issue became visi-
ble as the possibility of explicitly legal same-sex marriage became
very real; in 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court, in Baehr v.
Lewin,1 announced that laws forbidding same-sex marriage
would implicate the provision of the Hawaii constitution forbid-
ding discrimination on the basis of sex. Thus, a ban on same-sex
marriage would be constitutional only if supported by a compel-
ling state interest. On remand, the trial court ruled that the state
had provided no such proof and hence that it must permit mar-
riage between persons of the same sex as it does between persons
of different sexes.2 Absent either an unlikely reversal of that
judgment by the Hawaii Supreme Court or the passage of an
amendment to the Hawaii constitution forbidding such mar-
riages, same-sex marriage will soon be legal in Hawaii.
Both the opponents and the proponents of same-sex mar-
riage have generally assumed that "same-sex marriage" is
equivalent to "gay or lesbian marriage." In this Article, I focus
on the disjuncture between these terms by examining marriages
involving transgendered people (hereinafter referred to as
"transgender marriages"). Of course, these people and their re-
lationships are important in their own right. The underlying pur-
pose of examining them here, however, is as a means of
critiquing the opposition to same-sex marriage. The opponents
assume a fixity of gender and sex - biologically, socially, and
normatively - that is simply belied by transgender marriages.
1. 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993). The court held that a rule allowing a man to
marry a woman but not another man amounted to discrimination on the basis of the
sex of the proposed partner. Id. at 64.
2. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
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Furthermore, those false beliefs about gender are crucial to their
opposition to gay and lesbian same-sex marriages.
Until Baehr, no American court had ever ruled in favor of
same-sex marriage. In fact, a number of courts rejected chal-
lenges with an almost cruel dismissiveness. 3 The Hawaiian devel-
opments, however, changed the legal landscape across the
country. Lawsuits have been filed in at least three other states
seeking marriage rights for same-sex couples.4 In response, a
number of states added provisions to their laws specifying that
marriage is to be limited to different-sex couples.
The likely legality of same-sex marriage in Hawaii has also
evoked much discussion about whether other states will recog-
nize the same-sex marriages performed in Hawaii. The applica-
bility of the law regarding full faith and credit to marriages has
never been entirely clear. States have generally recognized mar-
riages performed elsewhere; one is not required to remarry upon
moving across state lines as one is required to obtain a new
driver's license. Nonetheless, states have sometimes refused to
recognize marriages performed elsewhere when the marriage was
evasionary (i.e., undertaken by residents of one state who go to
another state to take advantage of its looser marriage laws and
immediately return to their home state) and/or in violation of the
"strong public policy" of the home state. These decisions appear
to assume that the home state can, as a matter of choice-of-law
rules, make such decisions and is not bound to recognition under
the more restrictive rules of full faith and credit.
Undoubtedly, Hawaiian same-sex marriages will force courts
to confront these issues. In anticipation of that situation, Con-
gress passed the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"),5 which
3. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Jones v.
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn.
1971), affd, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974).
4. One case has been brought in Vermont by three couples. See Cheryl Wetz-
stein, Gay Couples Sue Vermont for Refusing Marriage Licenses, WASH. TIMES, July
23, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 3678718. The other was brought in New York
by Toshav and Phillip Storrs. See Yancey Roty, Gay Couple Asks Court for Mar-
riage License, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Nov. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8840951.
5. The section of DOMA dealing with marriage recognition is codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738C. It says that no state "shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding" of any other state "respecting a relationship be-
tween persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State .... or a right or claim arising from such relationship." Defense of
Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997)). DOMA also includes a provi-
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purports to free other states not to recognize such marriages.
Similarly, a number of states have passed legislation directing
courts not to recognize such marriages or declaring it the strong
public policy of the state to limit marriages to different-sex
couples. 6 None of this legislation has yet been judicially
reviewed.
The situation internationally is similar to that domestically.
No country gives full, unqualified marriage rights to same-sex
couples, though the domestic partner provisions in much of Scan-
dinavia provide for almost the same rights and duties as mar-
riage, both between the parties and vis-A-vis the state. 7 Great
Britain limits marriage to different-sex couples. The European
Court of Human Rights has rejected the claim that such a limita-
tion is in violation of the right to marry,8 holding that "the right
to marry.., refers to the traditional marriage between persons of
opposite biological sex" and that the relevant provision of the
Convention "is mainly concerned to protect marriage as the basis
of the family."9
sion, codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 which defines marriage for purposes of federal law and
regulation to "mean[ ] only a legal union between one man and one woman." Id. at
§ 3(a).
6. Sixteen states, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Illinois, Kan-
sas, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah had adopted such restrictive legislation as of
June 18, 1997. See Evan Wolfson, Anti-Marriage Bills 1997 - State-by-State Status
Report (last modified June 18, 1997) <http://www.ftm.org/overview/state-by-
state.html>. Legislation was introduced in many other states but was blocked or was
still pending at the time of the compilation.
In this Article, I avoid use of the term "opposite sex," except in quotations.
While males and females are different, the notion of "opposite" suggests a greater
distinction than seems true of human beings who share their membership in the
species Homo sapiens, and whose variability within sex categories is vastly greater
than the variability between men and women. The term "opposite sex" also embeds
a heterocentrist notion of a natural relationship between the sexes ("opposites at-
tract"). The concept of the two sexes as opposites, which may seem natural and
biological, is in fact historical and contingent. See THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING
SEx: BODY AND GENDER FROM T-E GREEKS TO FREUD (1990); Katherine M.
Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex
from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 70-74. (1995).
7. An Internet posting references such laws in Norway, Sweden, Iceland and
Hungary. See Bob Stock, 1 QUEERLAW-DIGEST 333 (Nov. 17, 1996) <http://aba-
cus.oxy.edu/pub/queerlaw/digests/v01.n333>.
8. See Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1987), 9 E.H.R.R.
56, 68 (1987) (construing Article 12 of the Convention on Human Rights, which
provides that "[m]en and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to
found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right").
9. Id.
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In Part II of this Article, I summarize the position of the
opponents of same-sex marriage, looking at both the statements
in judicial opinions rejecting same-sex marriage claims and the
arguments of commentators. I then turn to the question of trans-
genderism. In Part III, I briefly describe transsexualism and
transgenderism and the variety of ways in which the trans-
gendered status of one of the partners in a relationship can cre-
ate conflict with the legal rules limiting marriage to different-sex
pairs. Part IV examines the reasoning of the leading English and
American cases in which transgender marriages have been chal-
lenged as same-sex and therefore void. Part V brings the two
strands of the Article together to consider how the existence of
transgender marriages fundamentally challenges each of the ar-
guments used by opponents to same-sex marriage.
II. RATIONALES OF OPPONENTS TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
In order to establish rights to same-sex marriage, it is neces-
sary to understand the reasons given for opposing such rights.
The arguments can be found in a number of fora - the opinions
of those courts that denied claims for such marriage rights, the
arguments of litigants, and the writings of academics and other
commentators. I examine these arguments and then compare
them to transgender relationships in order to see how such rela-
tionships might serve to undermine or deconstruct the opposition
to same-sex marriage. Thus, I do not fully respond to these
claims nor cite to the extensive literature that responds to them.
To put it mildly, the earlier court opinions are under-theo-
rized, consider Baker v. Nelson, '0 Singer v. Hara," and Jones v.
Hallahan.12 Each rejects both the argument that the relevant
state statute does not limit marriage to different-sex couples and
the argument that any such limit is unconstitutional. Although
the statutes are silent, each court simply asserts that marriage by
its nature, tradition, or definition is an institution that requires
one man and one woman. This understanding is "as old as the
book of Genesis;"' 3 thus, what the plaintiffs "propose is not a
marriage.' 4 Because marriage has already been defined by the
court's ipse dixit as an inherently two-sexed institution, the rule
10. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), aff'd, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
11. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
12. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
13. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
14. Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 590.
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does not infringe on the constitutionally protected right to marry.
Similarly, Loving v. Virginia15 is an inapt analogy because the
gender rule, unlike the racial restriction on marriage in that case,
is descriptive of marriage, not a limitation on it.16 In all three
opinions there is but one phrase that provides any hint of a ra-
tionale - Baker v. Nelson notes, in passing, that marriage is an
institution "uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of
children.' 7
The arguments of the court were considerably more devel-
oped in Dean v. District of Columbia,'8 perhaps because the case
was the site of a major litigation effort.' 9 Nonetheless, the opin-
ions reach the same conclusion regarding the meaning of the
marriage statute, though with much greater detail. Again, it is
assumed that the word marriage means man-and-woman mar-
riage. The court relied on gendered statutes elsewhere in the do-
mestic relations law, case law from other jurisdictions, and "the
traditional understanding of 'marriage." 20 To define this tradi-
tional understanding of marriage, the court looked to Webster's
and Black's Law Dictionaries, both at the time the statute was
enacted and more recently, to conclude that "the word 'marriage'
... means the union of two members of the opposite sex."12'
As to the constitutional arguments, the majority held that
"same-sex marriage is not a 'fundamental right," 22 and that the
recognized fundamental right to marry was protected "because
of its link to procreation. '2 3 Thus, marriage was limited to per-
sons of opposite sexes - persons who could conceivably have
15. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia's anti-miscegenation law forbidding
interracial marriage was unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of race).
16. See Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191-92.
17. 191 N.W.2d at 186.
18. 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (There are three separate opinions by Judges Fer-
ren, Steadmen, and Terry. All agree in the ultimate ruling for the defendant).
19. William Eskridge, the lead counsel, is a professor at Georgetown who has
written extensively on issues of sexual orientation. The case also drew amicus sup-
port from the ACLU and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund.
20. Dean, 653 A.2d at 314-17.
21. Id. at 315. In his concurrence, Judge Terry asserts that a court could not
alter this definition, which reflects what the term has meant "for hundreds of years."
Id. at 362 (Terry, J., concurring). Compare the comments of Senator Coats (Repub-
lican from Indiana) that the "definition of marriage ... is rooted in our history, our
laws, our deepest moral and religious convictions, and our nature as human beings.
It is the union of one man and one woman. This fact ... cannot be altered." 142
CONG. REC. S4947 (daily ed. May 9, 1996).
22. Dean, 653 A.2d at 331.
23. Id. at 332-33.
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children with each other. While Judge Ferren would have recog-
nized an equal protection claim based on sexual orientation suffi-
cient to deny the defendant's summary judgment, he garnered no
other votes for this position.24 Judge Steadman, concurring, reit-
erated the special nature of those relationships protected by the
fundamental right to marry: they are "bound up with sexual rela-
tions, procreation, childbirth and child rearing" and are linked to
the "survival of the . . . species. '25 Special recognition of such
considerations "constitute the requisite substantial relationship
to an important government interest. '26 Judge Terry dismissed
the equal protection argument out-of-hand. Marriage, as Judge
Ferren stated, is by its nature limited to different-sex couples,
and thus "same-sex 'marriages' are legally and factually - i.e.,
definitionally - impossible. '' 27 The plaintiffs cannot claim dis-
crimination, for "the sameness of their gender prevents them
from entering into ... [that] legal status. '28
The opinions in these cases provide only the most fragmen-
tary bits of reasoning for why marriage is and should be limited
to different-sex couples. This is in part a reflection of the issues
before the courts. It is not wholly irrational, in divining legisla-
tive intent behind gender-neutral marriage laws, to look to dic-
tionaries or to (presumably) long and unbroken histories of
different-sex marriages. Yet the easy dismissal of the constitu-
tional arguments is more troubling, for the arguments seem
largely to assume, rather than explain, why the fundamental right
to marry is so limited. The sole "argument" is rooted in the con-
cept that marriage is protected because it is linked to notions of
family or, more specifically, procreation. Marriage is valued be-
cause of its contribution to the species in producing children and
because married couples presumably provide the best atmos-
phere for raising children.
The linkage between traditional marriage and children
forms the core of the Baehr v. Lewin holding that rejected the
plaintiff's due process claim29 and the claim for a "compelling
state interest" to overcome the equal protection claim on re-
24. See id. at 333.
25. Id. at 362-63 (Steadman, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 362, 364 (Steadman, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 361 (Terry, J., concurring).
28. Id.
29. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). Marriage is constitutionally
protected as "the logical predicate" of "the fundamental rights of procreation, child-
birth, abortion, and child rearing." Id. at 56.
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mand. This linkage is repeated in the arguments against same-
sex marriage presented in the amicus brief of the National Asso-
ciation for Research and Therapy on Homosexuality
("NARTH") in Baehr v. Miike.30 These arguments assert that
the ideal family constellation for the healthy psychological devel-
opment of children is the mother-father-child grouping3' and that
recognition of same-sex marriages might make the motherless or
fatherless child into an ideal instead of a recognized sub-optimal
form.32 A brief on behalf of a collection of religious conservative
organizations, led by the National Legal Foundation, argues as
follows: (1) same-sex marriage necessarily entails sodomy; (2)
sodomy, as Blackstone indicated, is contrary to the law of nature
and nature's God;33 and (3) the Declaration of Independence
makes it clear, all positive law should be construed to be consis-
tent with such natural law.34 Therefore, the court should not re-
quire Hawaii to recognize same-sex marriage, for to do so would
"perpetuate a dangerous trend in the law, whereby law has been
divorced from its religious moorings. '35 Finally, echoing the
views of the NARTH brief, these organizations argue that the
social science data on the effect on children is unclear and thus
"society must 'err' on the side of the traditional family. '36
The most diverse arguments against same-sex marriage ap-
pear in the briefs of the defendant, the State of Hawaii. In large
part, these arguments attempt to avoid the prior ruling of the
Hawaii Supreme Court which states that the restriction against
same-sex marriage implicates the provision of the Hawaii Consti-
tution forbidding sex discrimination. The defendant asserts re-
peatedly that the rule is really- one about sexual orientation
forbidding homosexual marriages. 37 The rule merely uses gender
30. See Amicus Brief for National Association for Research and Therapy on
Homosexuality at 2-3, Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, (Haw.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
31. See id.
32. The findings of the trial court that lesbian parenting structures produced
healthy children were dismissed on the grounds that they did not prove conclusively
"that there is no harm and that no harm will be found in the future," and thus that
the courts should avoid changes that are contrary to common sense. Id. at 5-8.
33. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
215-16 (15th ed. 1809).
34. See Amicus Brief of Coral Ridge Ministries Media et al., at 3-6, Baehr, 1996
WL 694235.
35. Id. at 7.
36. Id. at 8.
37. See State's Opening Brief at 12-19, Baehr, 1996 WL 694235.
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as a perfect proxy since the state argues that "heterosexual peo-
ple, by definition, do not wish to marry individuals of the same
sex."' 38 Interspersed with this argument are claims that might be
loosely classified as "tradition" and "children." The first claim
includes arguments that the state is entitled to reflect "the widely
held values of its people" in its marriage law, especially when "no
other society, past or present," has ever defined marriage
otherwise. 3
9
Furthermore, the state should not be required to give homo-
sexual relations the same approbation that it accords that rela-
tionship "that ha[s] always been the bedrock of civilization. '40
The state's arguments regarding same-sex marriage and children
largely echo those of the amici. The state has a concededly com-
pelling interest in fostering the propagation of the human race,
and that interest "is advanced by sanctioning only those mar-
riages in which procreation is possible."'41 The brief refers to the
conceded "unique paternal and maternal contribution" that can
be provided only "in the context of a traditional marriage.
'42
It is unsurprising that these litigation-generated documents
provide only superficial arguments against same-sex marriage.
One would assume, by contrast, that the literature generated by
academics and other commentators would provide a much richer,
more theoretically grounded set of arguments that might help us
understand the basis for opposition. Unfortunately, that litera-
ture is also thin, fragmentary, and generally under-theorized.
One quickly notices that only a small proportion of the bur-
geoning legal academic literature dealing with same-sex marriage
and other issues of sexual orientation is written from a conserva-
tive perspective. One of those conservative writers, Professor
Lynn Wardle of Brigham Young University, notes that between
1990 and mid-1995, only one of seventy-two law review articles,
notes, comments, or essays on same-sex marriage took an un-
compromising pbsition in favor of the existing limitations, while
sixty-nine were generally supportive of same-sex marriage
rights. 43 Wardle attributes this to a liberal hegemony in the law
38. Id. at 16.
39. Id. at 1.
40. State's Reply Brief at 7 n.8, Baehr, 1996 WL 694235.
41. Id. at 8.
42. State's Opening Brief at 32.
43. See Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-
Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REv. 1, 18-20 [hereinafter Wardle BYUJ.
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reviews that makes the expression of positions such as his "ta-
boo" in the academy. This taboo, he asserts, "may make publish-
ers of academic writing less willing to print articles expressing
viewpoints opposing gay/lesbian goals such as same-sex mar-
riage."' 44 Wardle is right that the absence of a fully developed
debate about such important public policy issues is a loss. He is
very partial, however, in his explanation for why few articles are
written in opposition to same-sex marriage. First, people choose
what they will spend great time and effort writing about by what
stirs their passions. Opposition to some other groups' claims of
rights is unlikely to evoke the sort of emotionally charged yet
disciplined response that would lead people to spend months and
years researching and writing about the issue.45 Second, the
rather weak quality of the few articles that are published in op-
position to same-sex marriage suggests that it is difficult if not
impossible to write something that is intellectually coherent and
rigorous from that viewpoint. If the existing literature contains
the best arguments that can be made, the position ought to lose
in an intellectually honest debate.
A review of this literature is a depressing task. Trying to
organize and analyze the various rationales is a bit like trying to
divide a bag of multicolored feathers into neat piles in a windy
room. Nonetheless, the exercise is worth the effort. Understand-
ing the intellectual weaknesses of the opposition may help focus
us on the more significant concern, i.e., responding to the polit-
ical and psychological biases that form the basis of popular and
legislative opposition.
The arguments opposing same-sex marriage are generally
classifiable under four headings. First, there are arguments of
tradition and definition: marriage is and always has been solely
between men and women. Same-sex marriage is a contradiction
in terms or, at least, an insult to the traditions and morals of soci-
ety. Second, there are arguments about the value of marriage:
traditional marriage is both a core of our civilization and an insti-
tution currently under threat. Treating same-sex relationships
(an inferior if not harmful social form) the same as traditional
marriage would undermine the status that is necessary to pre-
44. Id. at 22.
45. Wardle himself concedes that those most interested in same-sex family is-
sues will be likely to favor gay rights. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of
Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 839 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Wardle ILL].
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serve traditional marriage. Third, there are arguments based on
marriage as a vehicle for procreation: marriage is valued and pro-
tected because of its relationship to procreation. The essence of
marriage is the potentially procreative marital sexual act, and
such an act by definition cannot occur in same-sex relationships.
Fourth, there are the arguments about the risk to children: be-
cause the existence of approved same-sex relationships would
contradict necessary moral values, all children would be misled if
same-sex marriage were allowed. Furthermore, the recognition
of same-sex marriage would result in children being raised within
households without both a mother and a father; such families are
necessarily inferior loci for child rearing.
These rationales appear in various permutations in the com-
mentary. Perhaps the most coherent set of arguments is made by
natural law theorists, John Finnis, Robert George, and Gerard
Bradley. They assert that marital sex is a unique human good to
which all other sexual activity is deeply inferior. Finnis argues
that the "union of the reproductive organs of husband and wife
really unites them biologically. '46 Such an act by its nature is
potentially procreative, even between spouses who happen to be
sterile,47 and therefore has a meaning that extends beyond the
instrumental use of another person's body for one's pleasure.48
All other sexual acts lack this character and are thus inferior.
The state can and should deny its approbation to non-marital
sexual relationships. 49 The argument seems inconsistent for it
rests on the potentially procreative nature of particular bodily
joinings, yet includes within its approved category joinings in
which procreation is clearly impossible.
46. John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1049, 1066 (1994).
47. See id.
48. Cf. Hadley Arkes, The Closet Straight, NAT'L REV., July 5, 1993, at 43 (ho-
mosexual activity is inferior to penile-vaginal intercourse which is "the only sexuality
that can produce 'another generation"') (quoting Andrew Sullivan, The Politics of
Homosexuality, NEw REPUBLIC, May 10, 1993).
49. See Finnis, supra note 46, at 1053. Finnis would not criminalize sodomy if
carried out discreetly. Some natural law critics have taken even harsher positions
vis-A-vis homosexuality. Harry Jaffa asserts that "the very root of the meaning of
nature is generation," and that marriage by its nature is linked to procreation. Ho-
mosexuality is a violation of natural law and the failure to condemn it as immoral
sets a society on the slippery slope to the acceptance of "incest, rape, and other
enormities." Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO.
L.J. 261, 265-77 (1995) (discussing HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS OF THE CONsTTrUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION (1993)).
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George and Bradley claim that this critique misunderstands
the natural law position. Marriage itself is a good, apart from its
instrumental relation to procreation. Furthermore, the essence
of marriage is the "two-in-one-flesh communion of persons that
is consummated and actualized by sexual acts of the reproductive
type."' 50 They assert that, the term "reproductive type" avoids
the apparent dilemma of the nonfertile octogenarian by defining
a category that includes her marriage and marital intercourse as
"intrinsically good. '51 All these authors recognize the difficulty
in explaining such concepts to the rational, secular mind, but sug-
gest that that difficulty inheres in the reader rather than the text.
Bradley and George say that "[i]ntrinsic value cannot, strictly
speaking, be demonstrated.., it must be grasped in noninferen-
tial acts of understanding. '' 52 Primary evidence for its truth is
that the recognition of the intrinsic value of marriage is part of
"our legal and religious traditions. ' 53
The most extensive, academic argument against same-sex
marriage is presented in two lengthy articles by Lynn Wardle.5 4
His articles expand on all of the claims enumerated above.
Same-sex marriage cannot be a fundamental right because there
is no traditional or widespread support for it. 55 Marriage is his-
torically and by its nature heterosexual and "the heterosexual di-
mension of the relationship ... is the reason why marriage is so
valuable to individuals and society."5 6 Society, therefore, rightly
50. Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagina-
tion, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 305 (1995).
51. Id.; cf. ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL 46 (1996) (presenting
argument that "[e]ven with sterile people, there is a symbolism in the union of male
and female that speaks to the core nature of sexual congress and to its virtuous
instantiation"). See also Finnis, supra note 46, at 1065.
52. George & Bradley, supra note 50, at 307 (footnote omitted).
53. Id.
54. See Wardle BYU, supra note 43; Wardle ILL, supra note 45. See also Lynn
D. Wardle, Some Common-Sense Objections to Same-Sex Marriage (unpublished
manuscript, cited in Wardle BYU, supra note 43, at 5 n.7).
55. See Wardle BYU, supra note 43, at 57.
56. Wardle BYU, supra note 43, at 39; see also G. Sidney Buchanan, Same-Sex
Marriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 541, 567 (1985) (arguing that
the perception of marriage as sacred "would be compromised by enlarging its base
to include same-sex unions"). Eskridge summarizes this line of argument as resting
on the concern that "[t]o allow homosexual marriages would be to taint this good [of
marriage] and send a signal that the state is somehow approving such relationships."
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 104 (1996).
Perhaps the clearest explication of this traditional-definitional claim notes the
way in which "marriage, viewed now as a symbolic event, enacts, institutionalizes,
and ritualizes the social meaning of heterosexuality ... and maintains heterosexual-
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gives traditional marriage a special place and to claim that same-
sex relations are entitled to the same status sends us down a slip-
pery slope that would also protect incest or polygamy. 57 Further-
more, recognizing and protecting same-sex relationships as if
they were marriages would harm children. In particular, two
harms are likely. Children raised by homosexual parents are at
special risk of themselves engaging in homosexual behavior,
which is assumed to be a harm to them.58 Moreover, Wardle
seems to suggest that children raised in gay households are likely
to suffer the harms associated with parental extramarital
relationships.
59
In particular, Wardle perceives gender difference as essential
to marriage and parenting. Fathering is different from mothering
and children are best off if "raised by both a father and a
mother. '60 Two genders are equally necessary for the roles of
"husband" and "wife."
The concept of marriage is founded on the fact that the union
of two persons of different genders creates a relationship of
unique potential strengths and inimitable potential value to
society. The essence of marriage is the integration of a uni-
verse of gender differences . . . associated with sexual
identity.61
ity as a social identity." Richard D. Mohr, The Stakes in the Gay-Marriage Wars, in
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 105, 106 (Robert M.
Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997) [hereinafter SAME-SEX MARRIAGE].
57. See Wardle BYU, supra note 43, at 47. Conservative activist Robert Knight
extends the slippery slope analogy. If marriage is not limited to one man and one
woman, there is apparently no basis for not extending it to a man and his daughter
or a man and his dog. See Robert H. Knight, How Domestic Partnerships and "Gay
Marriage" Threaten the Family, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 56, at 108, 115.
58. See Wardle ILL, supra note 45, at 853-54. Disapproval of same-sex sexual
relations also provides ammunition for protecting all children from the temptations
toward such behavior. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 297 (1992)
(recognizing the possibility that societal disapproval of homosexuality may help
young people who are wavering to stay on the heterosexual side of the divide); SUL-
LIVAN, supra note 51, at 102 (stating that society should "resist ... the movement to
abolish" the distinctions between gay and straight to "reduc[e] the risk that ...
children will become homosexual" (quoting E.L. Pattullo)).
59. See Wardle ILL, supra note 45, at 856. See also Mark Strasser, Sodomy,
Adultery, and Same-Sex Marriage: On Legal Analysis and Fundamental Interests, 8
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 313, 326-29 (1998).
60. Wardle ILL, supra note 45, at 861.
61. Wardle BYU, supra note 43, at 39; cf. Buchanan, supra note 56, at 559
("[O]pposite-sex marriage, the status traditionally offered by government as the
framework in which sexual conduct may legally occur, is tied uniquely to the gender
of those seeking to enter the relationship.").
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Richard Posner, in his inimitable fashion, constructs a some-
what distinct, though overlapping set of arguments for restricting
marriage to different-sex couples. Tradition matters not because
marriage must always mean what it has meant, but because vari-
ous legal rules associated with marriage were designed for a het-
erosexual paradigm and their extension to same-sex couples
should be considered one-by-one. 62 Same-sex relationships (at
least among men) will be, on average, inferior to heterosexual
marriages, in light of: (1) "the male taste for variety in sexual
partners;"(2) the fact that the partners, as they age, will become
less attractive to each other, given men's desire for young and
attractive sexual partners; and (3) and the lack of children bio-
logically related to both, which are "the strongest cement of mar-
riage. ' '63 "[It would be misleading to suggest that homosexual
marriages are likely to be as stable or rewarding as heterosexual
marriages. '64 Society should be reluctant to "plac[e] a stamp of
approval on homosexuality" by permitting same-sex marriage.
65
Part of the reason Posner sees gay male relationships as in-
herently less stable is because they involve only men. The stabil-
ity of traditional marriage is a consequence of "the presence of a
female. ' 66 According to Posner, gay men, like all men, desire
frequent sexual encounters, a pattern exacerbated by the un-
availability of marriage, which is "an important device for taming
sexual desire. '67 However, gay men are also disproportionately
viewed as effeminate and found in unmanly occupations, while
lesbians are seen as mannish.68 While Posner does not specifi-
62. See POSNER, supra note 58, at 313.
63. Id. at 305-06. Arkes provides a related "reason" for excluding gays from
marriage. Marriage is an institution based on monogamy which "is not exactly the
vision of gay sex." Arkes, supra note 48, at 44.
64. POSNER, supra note 58, at 312. More bluntly, Robert Knight asserts that
"[c]alling two lesbians a 'marriage' is telling a lie." Knight, supra note 57, at 115.
Others have analogized the extension of marriage to same-sex couples as a "form of
grand theft ... [since] straights wouldn't really be married if gays were." RICHARD
D. MOHR, GAY IDEA: OUTING AND OTHER CONTROVERSIES 90 (1992). See also
Buchanan, supra note 56, at 567 ("[Ilt is perhaps too strong a statement to say that
loss of exclusiveness would trivialize opposite sex marriage.").
65. POSNER, supra note 58, at 311.
66. Id. at 307. Hadley Arkes asserts that men without women to domesticate
them suffer from numerous social ills and they are not "likely to be tamed to a
sudden civility if they are merely arranged, in sets of two or three." Arkes, supra
note 48, at 44. As Sullivan ironically notes, such arguments, carried to their logical
conclusion, would suggest that women would be best off in lesbian relationships. See
SULLIVAN, supra note 51, at 110.
67. POSNER, supra note 58, at 302.
68. See id. at 300-04.
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cally link these views of homosexuals to the opposition to same-
sex marriage, he notes that one reason for the negative reactions
to the perceived effeminacy of gay men may be a desire "to sort
everyone into one of just two unambiguous gender bins - the
'masculine' and the 'feminine."' 69 While he does not specifically
refer to children when concluding that same-sex marriage ought
not be legalized, he does specify, as a reason for caution, the con-
cern that such a rule might provide same-sex married couples the
"same rights of adoption and custody as heterosexual couples."' 70
The legal commentators tend to structure their arguments
largely within a constitutional structure. Since I am searching for
the public policy arguments - the arguments for why same-sex
relationships ought not be granted the status of marriage - it is
useful to look as well at those commentators that speak directly
to that issue. I focus on two who are exemplary of a larger set of
conservative commentators.
James Q. Wilson largely reiterates the natural law arguments
of Finnis and others. 71 Marriage has been understood and valued
as a heterosexual institution in every religion and culture.72 Mar-
riage is a supreme human value "for without it the newborn in-
fant is unlikely to survive or . . . prosper. ' 73 Marriage is thus
linked to procreation. But what of the sterile? Marriages be-
tween sterile heterosexual couples do not threaten the vision of
marriage as same-sex marriages do; "people ... want the form
observed even when the practice varies: a sterile marriage...
remains a marriage of a man and a woman. ' 74 Because same-sex
marriages are visibly different, they erode the public sense of
marriage as uniquely valuable and thus threaten the institution
itself. Finally, Wilson presses the argument around children.
Children, tradition shows, are best raised by married heterosexu-
69. Id. at 302.
70. Id. at 313. Like Wardle, he also assumes that it is undesirable that children
turn out gay and that any parent, if they could do so costlessly and without side
effects, would provide their child with a cure for homosexuality. See id. at 308-09.
71. See James Q. Wilson, Against Homosexual Marriage, in SAME-SEX MAR-
RIAGE, supra note 56, at 137.
72. See id. at 141.
73. Id. at 140. Similarly, Arkes suggests that the function of marriage is "the
generation of children" and the institution is thus not needed by gays. Arkes, supra
note 48, at 44. See also Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *6
(Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (Defense expert Dr. Eggebeen testified that "marriage
is a 'gateway to becoming a parent,' and marriage is synonymous with having
children.").
74. Wilson, supra note 71, at 140.
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als. Children deliberately brought into same-sex unions will
learn of their difference and we cannot "now say how grievous"
this knowledge will be.75 Again, the assumption is of harm; all
the evidence to the contrary is rebutted by noting that there are
only relatively small studies over relatively short periods. 76
Finally, a summary of the conservative arguments against
same-sex marriage would not be complete without a discussion of
the arguments of Robert H. Knight, the Director of Cultural
Studies at the Family Research Council. 77 He summarizes his ar-
guments at the beginning of his article. Legalizing same-sex mar-
riage is wrong because it would: (1) erode the priority given to
marriage over other relationships; (2) deny the "procreative im-
perative" behind the protection of marriage and family; (3) erode
the social stability derived from marriage-based kinship system;
and (4) increase the likelihood that children will be raised in
same-sex households "despite the clear danger this poses to chil-
dren's development of healthy sexual identities. ' 78 The article
then expands on these and other positions. Marriage is, by defi-
nition, a relationship between one man and one woman whose
purpose "is to stabilize sexuality and to provide the best environ-
ment in which to procreate and raise children. '79 If the term
"marriage" was used for any other relationship, it would be de-
valued.80 Marriage is valued because it is necessary to the sur-
vival of society. "[S]ocieties can get along quite well without
homosexual relationships, but no society can survive without het-
erosexual marriages and families." 81 A society that does not put
marriage and the family in a special, protected place is in danger
of chaos and political destruction.8 2 Extending marriage to
same-sex relationships necessarily transforms and weakens the
75. Id. at 144.
76. See id. at 143. This point is developed at much greater length in Wardle ILL,
supra note 45, at 851-52.
77. See Knight, supra note 57.
78. Id. at 108.
79. Id. at 119.
80. See id. at 115. This point is made in a more sophisticated fashion by Posner,
who argues that the informational value of knowing someone is married would be
lessened. Under current law, for example, "if our son or daughter tells us that he or
she is getting married, we know the sex of the prospective spouse." POSNER, supra
note 58, at 312. One would hope that most parents would have more direct informa-
tion about their offspring's sexual orientation.
81. Knight, supra note 57, at 114.
82. See id. at 117 (Knight does not explicate how recognizing gay and lesbian
marriage would have such apocalyptic consequences.).
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institution. It is, he argues, part of an agenda to "demote mar-
riage to a level with all other conceivable relationships. ' 83 Same-
sex pairings are inherently different and inferior. They are less
likely to be monogamous and they involve oral and anal sex,
which Knight describes as the "unhealthy behavior that is the es-
sence of homosexual sexual activity.
'84
Finally, homosexuality and its approval, by extending mar-
riage to same-sex couples, threaten children and the family.
Marriage is meant to benefit the children of that marriage and
other children as they seek role models. Any family other than
one with a biological mother and father present is necessarily in-
ferior. 85 Same-sex households are worse than divorced or single-
parent families, since they "present[ ] an aberrant form of sexual-
ity as something 'normal.'"86
Lurking within most of these arguments, though only inter-
mittently articulated, is a very specific and deeply gendered vi-
sion of legitimate marriage. 87 Andrew Sullivan explains the
position:
to legitimize homosexuality is to strike at the core of the possi-
bility of civilization - the heterosexual union and its social
affirmation - and to pervert the natural design of male and
female as the essential complementary parts of the universe.
88
Those relationships that are valued necessarily involve one man
and one woman. This is so because it has always been so. It is so
83. Id. at 112.
84. Id. at 116.
85. While Posner appears to adopt the sociobiological perspective that the ad-
vantage accrues from the genetic tie between the adults and child, others focus on
the gendered nature of the household. In the remand in Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV.
91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *3 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), the State of Hawaii
asserted that "it is best for a child that it be raised in a single home by its parents, or
at least by a married male and female." However, their own witness, Dr. Pruett,
returned to the genetic theme, arguing "that biological parents have a predisposition
which helps them in parenting children." Id. at *4.
86. Knight, supra note 57, at 119.
87. A number of commentators from the more liberal side of the spectrum also
see same-sex marriage as challenging the gender norms that underlie traditional
marriage, but argue that this supports a constitutional right to such marriages by
strengthening the analogy to Loving v. Virginia which held that a ban on interracial
marriages was unconstitutional. See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche
Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians
and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 631-33 (1992); Andrew Koppelman, Why
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 197 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender,
1988 Wis. L. REV. 187 (1988).
88. SULLIVAN, supra note 51, at 21.
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because proper sex requires a penis and a vagina and - at least
as a kind of legal fiction - the possibility of procreation. It is so
because men and women as such relate differently to children
and children require both maternal and paternal child-rearing
skills. Those relationships that are forbidden by a same-sex mar-
riage ban disrupt this gendered pattern. By doing so they cause
harm and offense. The majority of people opposes same-sex
marriage both because they find such relationships abhorrent
and because they are worried that such relationships would be
appealing if not surrounded by moral and legal disapproval.
Thus, society must both condemn same-sex relationships and be
seen as condemning them. The case of transgendered people and
their relationships, as elaborated below, challenges a number of
these arguments and their underlying presumptions.
89
III. EXISTING SAME-SEX MARRIAGES IN TRANSGENDER
RELATIONSHIPS
The debate about same-sex marriage falsely assumes: (1)
that the issue is whether same-sex marriages will be permitted in
the future; and (2) that it is a simple matter to categorize a given
relationship as same-sex or different-sex. While there are proba-
bly few transsexual marriages,90 they do exist and they serve as a
conceptual point for deconstructing the same-sex marriage de-
bate. Ignoring transgendered people and their relationships is
both a moral wrong to this minority and a mistake in developing
the theoretical tools for the larger debate. To help combat this
omission, I want to briefly describe: (1) the characteristics of
transgenderism; and (2) the varieties of intimate relationships in-
volving transgendered people.
89. Martine Rothblatt calls this the "apartheid of sex" and says that "blurring of
class boundaries is the gravest offense because it challenges the reality of the divi-
sion of reality." MARTINE ROTHBLATr, THE APARTHEID OF SEX: A MANIFESTO ON
THE FREEDOM OF GENDER 19 (1995).
90. Some members of the transsexual community report a "VERY rough" esti-
mate of 150-250 transsexual-rooted "legal same sex marriages." Janet Elizabeth
Flecher, 1 QUEERLAW-DIGEST 268 (Sept. 21, 1996) <http://abacus.oxy.edu/pub/
queerlaw/digest/v01.n268>. The number may be higher. By one estimate, one-half
of one percent of the population does not fit easily and clearly within the category
"man" or "woman." See Laura Markovitz, When the Mirror Is Wrong, 1 FAMILY 3
(1995) (citing family therapist Gary Sanders). While such persons may have a signif-
icantly lower marriage rate than the general population, this would suggest a sub-
stantially larger number of marriages in which one of the partners is, in some way,
gender transgressive.
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A. Characteristics of Transgenderism
Although transgenderism is often conflated with homosexu-
ality, the characteristic, which defines transgenderism, is not sex-
ual orientation, but sexual identity. Transgenderism describes
people who experience a separation between their gender and
their biological/anatomical sex.91 For some transgendered peo-
ple, core gender identity is different from their sex; others engage
in a gender presentation that is different from that associated
with their sex. The transgender community comprises people of
different races, ages, genders, classes, and family situations.
Thus, different meanings will be attached to their transgenderism
and different social consequences will flow from their attempts to
express that sexual identity. As the case of Renee Richards 92 in-
dicates, a successful doctor and tennis star can afford to obtain
sex reassignment surgery and hire expensive lawyers to litigate
her claim to play tennis as a woman. Richards's situation is both
similar to and radically different from that of a working-class
transsexual who cannot afford surgery or who will lose his job at
the factory when he cross-dresses.
93
There are also important differences within the trans-
gendered community which are linked to the very criteria that
91. Analysis of transgender issues thus provides a means for examining the ana-
lytical distinctions between sex and gender. See, e.g., Meredith Gould, Sex, Gender,
and the Need for Legal Clarity: The Case of Transsexualism, 13 VAL. U. L. REV. 423
(1979). Unfortunately, perhaps in a misguided attempt to desexualize the concept of
sex discrimination, the Supreme Court has misused the term gender when it means
sex. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (noting that the case
"does not involve peremptory strikes exercised on the basis of femininity or mascu-
linity ... [t]he case involves ... sex discrimination plain and simple") (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
In thus separating sex and gender analytically, I do not mean to accept the
notion that gender is the epiphenomenon of sex. Rather, I believe it is closer to the
truth, as Katherine Franke says, that "sex bears an epiphonemenal relationship to
gender; that is, under close examination, almost every claim with regard to sexual
identity or sex discrimination can be shown to be grounded in normative gender
rules and roles." Franke, supra note 6, at 2. For purposes of this Article, the central
fact is the distinction between sex and gender, not their logical or metaphysical
relationship.
92. See Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1977).
93. Cf. Doe v. Boeing, 846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993) (Transsexual engineer at Boe-
ing sued unsuccessfully after she was terminated for wearing "excessively" feminine
clothing). Given the limited success of transsexuals in legal challenges, it is unlikely
that any transsexual who cannot afford attorney's fees will be able to hire private
counsel on a contingency fee basis. There is also, to my knowledge, no established
national public interest organization whose focus is the pro bono litigation of trans-
gender legal issues.
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define that community. The collectivity of those who are defined
by their "non-normative" position on issues of sexual identity in-
cludes, but is not limited to transsexuals. Transsexuals under-
stand themselves to be members of the "opposite sex"94 from
that which their genitals would suggest and often seek sex reas-
signment surgery to make those genitals match their core gender
identity. In effect, transsexuals seek to become, physically, so-
cially, and legally the sex they have always been psychologically.
If they succeed in doing so, transsexuals often consider them-
selves simply to be members of their new sex, rejecting any em-
phasis on how they arrived there.95 In that sense, one might
imagine them as akin to the "virtually normal" gay folk who want
to be part of a world in which sexual orientation is as insignifi-
cant as eye color, and disappear into the melting pot of the
straight world.96 Other transsexuals have claimed transsexualism
as a basis for an identity and they have built a politicized commu-
nity. Those who use the term "transgenderism" see themselves
as connected to the gay/lesbian community; this larger grouping
is sometimes referred to by the umbrella term "queer. '97
94. See supra note 6 (on use of term "opposite sex").
95. "Transsexuals usually just want to live their lives as men and women and do
not ordinarily want to be part of any particular group, life-style, or social cause."
KIM ELIZABETH STUART, THE UNINVITED DILEMMA: A QUESTION OF GENDER 47
(1983). See also ANNE BOLIN, IN SEARCH OF EVE: TRANSSEXUAL RiTEs OF PAS-
SAGE 70-71 (1988) ("[A]t some point during full-time status [male-to-female
transsexuals] transform their personal and social identities to the point that they
view themselves as natural women ... and reject their transsexual identity as well as
the term passing.").
Transsexuals might also be seen as the conservative wing of the transgender
community because they do not challenge the notion that there are two sexes and
two genders which match them, only their individual place within that framework.
See Leslie Pearlman, Transsexualism as Metaphor.- The Collision of Sex and Gender,
43 BUFF. L. REV. 835, 846 (1995) (asserting that sex reassignment surgery "essen-
tially reassigns individuals from an existence which represents a fundamental chal-
lenge to social construction of gender . . . to an existence which is no longer
threatening").
96. Cf. SULLIVAN, supra note 51 (arguing for legal protection of gays and lesbi-
ans who are "straight" in all but their choice of erotic partners and against the no-
tion of a distinct "queer" identity).
97. See Carey Goldberg, Shunning "He" and "She," They Fight for Respect,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1996, at 24; GORDENE OLGA MACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER NA-
TION (1994) (arguing that demand for sex reassignment surgery as a response to
"gender dysphoria" is culturally contingent and proposing nonsurgical cross-gender
living along the model of the berdache). Only in the last few years have trans-
gendered persons formed an organization, "It's Time, America," specifically
designed to advance their interests in the political arena. See Jane Fee, Round Table
Discussion on Transgender Activism, PROCEEDINGS FOURTH INT'L CONF. ON
TRANSGENDER L. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y 59 (1995). On the development of open
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The transgender community also includes nontranssexual
people whose gender identity or presentation does not consist-
ently or completely match the gender that society insists is the
natural and necessary correlate to their anatomical sex. Cross-
dressers98 wear the clothes associated with the other sex. Some
do so to obtain employment unavailable to persons of their ana-
tomical sex or because cross-dressing provides pleasure; others
do so to express aspects of their identity they find inexpressible
when dressing and acting in conformance with what is socially
expected of persons with their anatomy.99 While outside observ-
ers may assume cross-dressers are gay, the cross-dressing com-
munity has traditionally defined itself as specifically
heterosexual, 100 excluding a priori the cross-dressing drag queen
and stone butch. In effect, both the gay/lesbian and the trans-
gender communities have historically marginalized or excluded
gays and lesbians who were also cross-dressers and gender
nonconformists.101
and politicized transgender organizations, see generally Anne Bolin, Transcending
and Transgendering: Male-to-Female Transsexuals, Dichotomy and Diversity, in
THIRD SEX, THIRD GENDER: BEYOND SEXUAL DIMORPHISM IN CULTURE AND HIS-
TORY 447, 472-74 (Gilbert Herdt ed., 1994).
98. Psychologists and other outside "experts" generally use the term transves-
tism for this phenomenon; those within the community generally prefer the term
cross-dressing.
99. See Bolin, supra note 97, at 458. The last reason is an issue for men today
who are, as men, inhibited from forms of emotionalism deemed to "effeminate."
The extent to which transsexualism and transvestism are distinctive phenomena is a
matter of contention, with transsexuals more likely to perceive the two as entirely
distinct and cross-dressers to perceive a continuum between them. See id. at 457-58.
100. Bolin notes that "gay cross-dressers were eliminated from the Berdache
Society," which thus became an organization solely for male-to-female transsexuals
and heterosexual male cross-dressers. Id. at 451; see also MACKENZIE, supra note
97.
101. Cf. Elvia R. Arriola, Faeries, Marimachas, Queens, and Lezzies: The Con-
struction of Homosexuality Before the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 33 (1995) (discussing erasure of drag queens and other gender nonconformists in
gay history). I believe that the move toward alliance with the transgendered com-
munity reflects, and is partly dependent on, the change within the gay and lesbian
community to include our gender rebels. By contrast, the proponents of a lesbian
feminism that condemns butch and femme roles cannot accept the possibility of
political or epistemological linkages with transgenderism. Cf. JANICE RAYMOND,
THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-MALE (1994) (harsh feminist
critique of transsexualism).
Nonetheless, the alliance is not a simple one. Insofar as transsexuals insist that
maleness is defined by masculinity and femaleness by femininity, they challenge the
insistence of many effeminate gay men and butch lesbians (as well as of more radical
transgenderists) that one's sex is not dependent on one's gender presentation and,
indeed, that there is nothing necessarily binary about gender itself.
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Transgenderism also includes people who cannot be neatly
pigeonholed as either transsexuals or cross-dressers, but who live
in a variety of ways that reject the dichotomy of gender, the place
they have been assigned within that dichotomy, or both. 0 2
Transgenderism includes, for example, nonoperative transsexuals
and bi-gendered people.10 3 A person born with male genitalia
might understand herself to be a woman. She might dress, live,
present herself publicly as a woman, and perhaps take hormones
to induce some physical shifts toward a more feminine body, but
choose not to undergo sex reassignment surgery. As far as she is
concerned, she is a woman and what is between her legs does not
affect that identity. 10 4 Tom/Sharon, my acquaintance who de-
scribes himself as "bi-gendered," rejects simple gender dichoto-
mies in a different way. Tom/Sharon chooses, at different times,
and in response to particular social and psychological incentives
to present him/herself as male or female. The anatomy remains
the same; the dress, walk, voice patterns, and sense of self
shift. 10 5 One might think of him/her as the transgendered
equivalent of the bisexual.
[P]reoperative, postoperative and nonsurgical transsexuals as
well as male and female cross-dressers and transvestites...
form a transgender community that is in the process of creat-
ing not just a third gender but the possibility of numerous gen-
ders and multiple social identities. 10 6
The two communities also must confront their conflicted and tangled cultural
roots. For example, one Sees a struggle over history: are those women who cross-
dressed to avoid the strictures of the female role proto-transsexuals, or proto-lesbi-
ans, or both? More contemporaneously, consider the hostile reaction of transgender
activists when a Village Voice writer referred to murdered female-to-male transsex-
ual Brandon Teena as a lesbian, in effect denying Teena the pronoun he died for
ciaiming. See Michelangelo Signorile, Transgender Nation, OUT, June 1996, at 40.
Transgender folks and their allies have also condemned the erasure of' the trans-
genderism of the leading figures in the Stonewall riots. See, e.g., Arriola, supra, at
33. Bolin suggests that the common use of the berdache as a model by the trans-
gender and homosexual communities may facilitate affiliation between the groups.
See Bolin, supra note 97, at 477.
102. See, e.g., ROTHBLATr, supra note 89, at 3 ("[M]anhood and womanhood can
be life-style choices open to anyone, regardless of genitalia.").
103. See id.
104. Phyllis Frye, a Texas lawyer and transgender activist, has facilitated docu-
mentation of their new gender identity for two such nonsurgical transsexuals.
105. Interview with Tom/Sharon in Houston, Tex. (July 4-6, 1996). See also Rich-
ard M. Levine, Crossing the Line: Are Transsexuals at the Forefront of aRevolution
- Or Just Reinforcing Old Stereotypes About Men and Women?, MOTHER JONES
INTERACriVE (May/June 1994) <http://www.motherjones.com/mother-jones/MJ94/
levine.html>.
106. Bolin, supra note 97, at 447.
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Transgenderists also vary on the dimension of sexual orien-
tation. Transgenderism and homosexuality are not simply two
faces of the same characteristic, as suggested by social conserva-
tives who label all such people as "perverts.' 10 7 In an attempt to
bring scientific clarity to the phenomenon of transsexualism, the
earliest theorists rejected this conflation and insisted that "the
transsexual is not a homosexual.' ' 10 8 Some even made heterosex-
uality one of the diagnostic criteria. 109 The criterion of hetero-
sexuality reflected a deep-seated homophobia. A transsexual
with male anatomy had to be a straight woman in a man's body.
Thus, her desire for men was not perverse. But what if she un-
derstood herself to be a woman attracted to women? The doc-
tors and psychiatrists were not and still frequently are not
prepared to change what looked like a straight man into a
lesbian. 110
These researchers and activists were correct in rejecting the
notion that homosexuals comprised a third sex' or that they
were in essence suffering from gender confusion."a 2 But they
107. See, e.g., Jeff Vos, The Homosexual Threat: The Battle Rages (visited Apr.
28, 1998) <http://alpha.ftcnet.com/-freedom/colum/vosl.html#the battle rages>.
108. Edward S. David, Note, The Law and Transsexualism: A Faltering Response
to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CoNN. L. REV. 288, 292 (1975). But see Michael W.
Ross, Gender Identity: Male, Female or a Third Gender, in TRANSSEXUALISM AND
SEX REASSIGNMENT (William Walters & Michael Ross eds., 1986) (noting that there
is not necessarily a link between transsexualism and sexual orientation, and citing
one study which showed that postoperative transsexuals were disproportionately
homosexual).
109. See Ross, supra note 108.
110. "A review of the professional literature revealed that heterosexuality was
frequently cited as an intrinsic attribute and defining feature of transsexualism."
Bolin, supra note 97, at 460. See also HARRY BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHE-
NOMENON 22-23 (1966) (defining transsexuals as, inter alia, oriented towards persons
of the "opposite" sex of his/her psychological sex). Furthermore, traditionally
"transsexuals are ... required to divorce their spouses before a surgeon may per-
form the conversion operation" so as not to create a legal same-sex marriage. Bolin,
supra note 97, at 454. Nonetheless, studies of transsexuals themselves suggest that a
substantial proportion define themselves as gay or bisexual. See STUART, supra note
95, at 49-60. These sources may somewhat overstate matters. None of my survey
respondents indicated that medical personnel used issues of family status or sexual
orientation to screen them for the availability of sex reassignment surgery.
111. For a discussion of this concept and its historical application to both homo-
sexuals and transgendered persons see, for example, THIRD SEX, THIRD GENDER:
BEYOND SEXUAL DIMORPHISM IN CULTURE AND HISTORY, supra note 97; GEORGE
CHAUVNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF
THE GAY MALE WORLD 1890-1940 49-63 (1994).
112. This collapse of transgenderism and homosexuality is still apparent in the
responses to children who do not behave in "gender-appropriate" ways. They are
perceived by parents and therapists as proto-homosexuals and/or proto-transsexuals
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were wrong when they replaced a false concept of necessary
sameness - that all transsexuals must be homosexual - with an
equally false concept of necessary difference - that all transsex-
uals must be heterosexual. Gays and lesbians do not necessarily
experience gender confusion; transgendered people are not nec-
essarily gay,113 but there are transgendered lesbians and trans-
gendered gay men.
B. A Survey of Transgendered People
Given the range of characteristics of transgendered people,
including their various sexual orientations, they may face a vari-
ety of obstacles to legalized marriage. 114 To develop some under-
standing of the variety of transgender relations and the legal
barriers for each, I sent out a survey by e-mail1 15 asking respon-
dents about their gender status and their intimate relationships
before and after transition. The potential respondents - trans-
gender activists I knew and people to whom they passed on the
survey - form a wholly unscientific sample. Nonetheless, the
results may at least provide some evidence of the range of
possibilities.
All but one of the respondents were already taking hor-
mones. Some had undergone significant numbers of surgeries re-
lated to their sex reassignment, such as mastectomies for
and subject to forced treatment. See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How To Bring Your
Kids Up Gay, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET 69 (Michael Warner ed., 1994); Shan-
non Minter & Phyllis Randolph Frye, GID and the Transgender Movement: A Joint
Statement by the International Conference on Transgender Law and Employment
Policy ("ICTLEP") and the National Center for Lesbian Rights ("NCLR") (1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
113. Although some of her correspondents still assume cross-dressing equals ho-
mosexual, Ann Landers, that repository of Middle America wisdom, reports that
experts say "while some cross-dressers are homosexual or bisexual, some are not."
Ann Landers, Couples Can Come to Terms with Cross-Dressing Issue, MIAMI HER-
ALD, May 21, 1993, at 2F. See also Ann Landers, Cross-Dressing Is Not Necessarily
Homosexuality, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 13, 1997, at 5C.
114. As Pat Califia notes, there is a dearth of literature about transsexuals' erotic
relationships. Most of the literature by and about transsexualism tends to describe
atomized individuals, focusing on their gender identity to the exclusion of their sex-
ual activities and relationships. See PAT CALIFIA, SEX CHANGES: THE POLInCS OF
TRANSGENDERISM 196-208 (1997) (describing, and beginning to remedy, this lack of
attention).
115. I prepared a questionnaire and distributed it through the Internet to trans-
genderd activists with the request that they redistribute it within their communities.
I received approximately three dozen responses. The number of people who saw the
posting is unknown. Copies of the survey and responses (with identifying informa-
tion deleted) are on file with the author.
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females-to-males ("FTM") or breast implants and voice box sur-
gery to raise the voice pitch for males-to-females ("MTF").
Some had scheduled but not yet completed "full" surgical trans-
formation. A number of respondents, however, were in a more
ambiguous or transitional place. They were unsure if they
wanted to undergo "bottom" surgery to construct the genitalia of
their chosen sex. Some simply answered "no" to the question
"have you had" or "are you planning to have" surgery. Others
indicated that they probably would not undergo surgery because
of financial limitations or health problems that made major sur-
gery dangerous. Regardless of the stage at which they found
themselves or their ultimate anatomical goals, all defined them-
selves as transsexual.
A significant number of the respondents had been in long-
term committed relationships prior to their decision to begin hor-
mone therapy or sex reassignment surgery. Most of these, like
most of the respondents overall, were MTF and each was mar-
ried, at least initially. In each case, the nature of the relationship
changed; they described their current relationships with their
wives as being "like sisters" or no longer sexual. One MTF de-
scribed her wife's "sadness at the loss of penetration." These
marriages continued for some of the same reasons that other
couples' marriages continue: commitment, affection, and eco-
nomic interdependence, including the wife's need for continued
employment-based health benefits. A number of respondents
expressed concern that these benefits might be at risk because of
their employer's knowledge of their sex change; at least one had
to persuade her employer that her marital status was unchanged
by her change in sex. Half the MTF respondents saw their prior
marriages end either before the change or during the transition.
One MTF attributed her marital separation to her wife's unwill-
ingness to become a lesbian.
None of the FTM respondents had been married. One had
been involved with a genetic male; three had been in lesbian rela-
tionships. One relationship continued and they married after the
respondent's sex reassignment surgery. This couple are currently
seeking to allow the wife to execute a second parent adoption of
the child the he bore when he was still genetically female. Two
other lesbian relationships ended, one when the partner of the
FTM transitioned into a gay man. The respondent later also
transitioned but has become a heterosexual man.
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A smaller proportion of the respondents have formed long-
term intimate relationships since their transitions. Half of them
remain heterosexual and in two cases they married their new
partners without having or needing a changed birth certificate.
Conversely, two of the three MTFs in new relationships with ge-
netic females have married or plan to marry their partners by
relying on their unchanged birth certificates to obtain marriage
licenses for what appear to be and are experienced as lesbian
relationships.
While one can draw no statistical conclusions from fewer
than thirty responses, one can see the wide range of possibilities
in terms of the gender status of the respondents, their sexual ori-
entation, the responses of prior partners to the transition deci-
sion, and the kinds of post-transition intimate relationships these
respondents have chosen. In the next Part, I examine the ways in
which legal institutions have dealt with some of these issues.
IV. THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO TRANSGENDERED MARRIAGES
There are few reported legal decisions involving the inter-
section of transgendered persons and marriage rights. That small
set of decisions, however, provides a useful lens for examining
how the law constructs gender and what it means when it re-
quires that marriage partners not be of the "same sex." For
whatever reason, the British cases are by far the most lengthy.
They provide a thick description of the parties and their relation-
ship, as well as a detailed analysis of the relevant law and related
medical and social science. I begin with a recounting of Corbett
v. Corbett"16 and J. v. S.-T 117 before turning to the American
cases.
A. Corbett v. Corbett
Even for one who does not find transsexualism itself pecu-
liar, Corbett's facts are strange.118 The petitioner-husband, Ar-
thur Corbett, was already married when he met the respondent.
Corbett was a transvestite who associated with a "deviant" sub-
culture and had engaged in homosexual encounters. He was in-
116. [1970] 2 All E.R. 33.
117. [1997] 3 W.L.R. 1287.
118. The case involved "a relationship with a rather odd man of varied sexual
inclinations: heterosexual, homosexual, and transvestite." Douglas K. Smith, Com-
ment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery, and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REV.
963, 1007 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
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trigued when he learned about April Ashley, who was born
George Jamieson, had spent time as a merchant seaman, had
joined a troupe of female impersonators, and had later under-
gone sex reassignment surgery. Arthur arranged a meeting with
Ashley and apparently fell in love. His feelings for her "had be-
come those of a full man in love with a girl" 119 and he asked her
to marry him, though he also testified that he was jealous of her
success at femininity. The two spent less than two weeks to-
gether after the wedding and, within a few months, Arthur suc-
cessfully sought an annulment on two grounds: April was a man
and she had refused to consummate the marriage.
In the course of his decision, Lord Ormrod, who was a phy-
sician as well as a judge, 120 discussed at length the sexual pecu-
liarities of the parties and transsexualism in general. He set out
several potential criterion for determining an individual's sex,
12'
and concluded that the most significant determinants were those
which he held constituted biological sex: chromosomes, gonads,
and genitals. These biological traits were fixed at birth and de-
termined the individual's "true sex," which was unaffected by any
later actions, including sex reassignment surgery.
22
Lord Ormrod's explanations, for the importance of sex cate-
gorization and for the choice of these criteria, are rooted in a
particular, heterocentric view of marriage. He explained his de-
cision as follows:
sex is clearly an essential determinant of the relationship
called marriage, because it is and always has been recognized
as the union of man and woman. It is the institution on which
the family is built, and in which the capacity for natural heter-
osexual intercourse is an essential element .... Since mar-
riage is essentially a relationship between man and woman,
the validity of the marriage in this case depends, in my judg-
ment, on whether the respondent is or is not a woman ....
The question then becomes what is meant by the word "wo-
119. [1970] 2 All E.R. at 38 (quoting Arthur Corbett).
120. See Smith, supra note 118, at 1005 n.277.
121. The listed criteria include: (i) Chromosomal factors, (ii) Gonadal factors
(i.e., the presence or absence of testes or ovaries), (iii) Genital factors (including
internal sex organs), (iv) Psychological factors, and (v) Hormonal factors or secon-
dary sexual characteristics (such as distribution of hair, breast development, phy-
sique, etc. which are thought to reflect the balance between the male and female sex
hormones in the body). See Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. at 44.
122. Such surgery would have no effect on the person's chromosomes and could
not produce functioning gonads (i.e., testes or ovaries). While external genitalia are
constructed in such surgery, Lord Ormrod determined, in effect, that these were not
sufficiently functional to count in his analysis. Id.
19981
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man" in the context of a marriage .... Having regard to the
essentially heterosexual character of the relationship which is
called marriage, the criteria must, in my judgment, be biologi-
cal, for even the most extreme degree of transsexualism in a
male or the most severe hormonal imbalance which can exist
in a person with male chromosomes, male gonads and male
genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is naturally capable
of performing the essential role of a woman in marriage.
123
The heterocentrism in Lord Ormrod's opinion is apparent; what
is somewhat less clear is his rationale for that heterocentrism.
What is the "essential role of a woman in marriage" that requires
that marriage match a "real" woman and a "real" man? One
possibility is that the role is one which Ashley concededly could
not perform - procreation. Ormrod, like many of the oppo-
nents of same-sex marriage, might assume that marriage is funda-
mentally a means to procreation.
124
The logical flaws in the procreation argument are glaringly
obvious. First, no state has ever required proof of capacity to
procreate before issuing a marriage license to a different-sex
couple, as the weddings of the inhabitants of various retirement
communities attest. Second, procreation does not need marriage.
Third, procreation does not, in the late twentieth century, even
need intercourse, as the sperm banks set up to facilitate the les-
bian baby boom demonstrate. 125 Fourth, parenting does not re-
quire procreation: singles and couples, whether married,
unmarried, straight, gay, or transgendered can successfully adopt
and raise children if the state will let them. Finally, even if we
assumed that marriage was a preferred environment for raising
children because it provides a stable home with two adults deeply
committed to the child's welfare, it is unclear how children
123. [1970] 2 All E.R. at 48 (emphasis added).
124. Cf. Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *6-7 (Haw. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (describing the analogous argument by Hawaii's witnesses). Gay
rights, including the right to same-sex marriage, have been criticized on the grounds
that "'[s]exuality' refers to that part of our nature that has as its end the purpose of
begetting .... [o]ther forms of 'sexuality' may be taken as minor burlesques or even
mockeries of the true thing." Hadley Arkes, Questions of Principle, Not Predictions:
A Reply to Macedo, 64 GEO. L.J. 321, 323 (1995). See also Finnis, supra note 46, at
1066-67 (1994).
125. While much assisted reproduction is directed at childless heterosexuals, the
lesbian community has developed its own institutions to facilitate reproduction. See
LAURA BENKOV, REINVENTING THE FAMILY: THE EMERGING STORY OF LESBIAN
AND GAY PARENTS 116-27 (1994).
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reared by heterosexual parents would be harmed because other
adults could enter into same-sex marriage.
126
Alternatively, the judge in Corbett may have meant that the
essential role of a woman in marriage is to provide a vagina as a
penis receptacle. Ashley was, however, a post-operative MTF
transsexual; she had a vagina. Furthermore, an earlier British
case had held that a husband was not entitled to an annulment
because his wife had a physical defect that rendered intercourse
impossible, because an operation was available that could ade-
quately enlarge her vaginal cavity. 127 The judge in that case re-
jected the husband's argument that a "mere cul-de-sac leading
nowhere" was insufficient.1 28 Lord Ormrod, however, in al-
lowing Corbett's claim based on Ashley's alleged refusal to con-
summate, stated:
I would, if necessary, be prepared to hold that the respondent
was physically incapable of consummating a marriage because
I do not think that sexual intercourse, using the completely
artificial cavity constructed by Dr. Burou, can possibly be de-
scribed.., as "ordinary and complete intercourse" or as "vera
copula" - of the natural .... When such a cavity has been
constructed in a male, the difference between sexual inter-
course using it, and anal or intra-crural intercourse is, in my
judgment, to be measured in centimeters.
1 29
The syllogism seems to be that (1) Ashley was born male; (2)
therefore Ashley is still male; (3) therefore intercourse between a
man and Ashley is inherently sodomy. For the judge to hold this
marriage legitimate would be to bridge the gap - perhaps of
mere centimeters - between "normal" heterosexual sexual rela-
tionships and homosexual ones. In effect, the judge by an act of
126. Cf. Jonathan Rauch, For Better or Worse?, NEW REPUBLIC, May 6,1996, at
18, 22 (arguing, contrary to conservative opponents of same-sex marriage, that pur-
poses for promoting marriage include "domesticating men and providing reliable
caregivers" as well as promoting procreation). For arguments in favor of permitting
gay marriages, despite their nonprocreative character, see generally ESKRIDGE,
supra note 56, at 62-74.
As Senator Barbara Boxer somewhat flippantly asked in her floor statement
opposing DOMA, "Does the author of the bill in the House, whom the press says
has been married three times, truly believe that the Defense of Marriage Act would
have made him a better husband or his wives better wives?" E-mail from Barbara
Boxer, United States Senator, to Mary Coombs, Professor of Law, (Sept. 18, 1995)
(on file with author).
127. See S. v. S. (otherwise W.), [1962] 3 All E.R. 55.
128. Id. at 59.
129. [1970] 2 All E.R. at 49. The term "intra-crural" refers to a form of inter-
course in which the penis of one partner moves back and forth between the thighs of
the other.
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will denies the existence of gender ambiguity in the face of facts
that make such ambiguity undeniable.
B. S.-T.v.J.
In 1995, the British courts were again faced with the situa-
tion of a transsexual marriage. 130 The transsexual partner had
conceded the marriage was void so the formal question before
the court was whether he was entitled to seek ancillary relief as a
party to an annulled marriage. In the course of its opinion, how-
ever, the court examined the holding of Corbett in light of inter-
vening human rights law and developments in the medical
understandings of transsexualism.
The defendant, Michael, was born female, but understood
himself to be male from an early age. He took hormones and
had a radical mastectomy but, because of medical complications,
never had surgery to change his female genitals. He began a sex-
ual relationship with a woman who was described as sexually
naive. They married and had two children by artificial insemi-
nation. Michael never told his wife of his transsexual status. Af-
ter approximately sixteen years of marriage, the wife filed for di-
vorce. At that time she told an old school friend, who happened
to be a private investigator, about some of her concerns about
Michael - "his nipples, the scars under his arms, the fact that he
used an artificial penis and the [blood] stains upon his under-
pants," and of her belief that he was not very well endowed, per-
haps "even sexually deformed." Her friend investigated and told
her that Michael's birth certificate showed him to be a female
named Wendy. The wife was apparently completely taken aback;
"the sight of the birth certificate appears to have triggered the
realization on her part that there was something fundamentally
wrong." Michael, who had made every effort not to discuss his
gender status with his wife, was also upset by the revelation. The
wife then sought a nullification of the marriage on the grounds
that legal marriage requires a man and a woman. Michael did
not contest the nullification.
The issue in the reported case was whether the former hus-
band could apply for ancillary relief. Statutes normally conferred
discretion on a trial judge to provide for property division or sup-
port after a nullified marriage, although not where the parties
130. See S.-T. v. J. [1997] 3 W.L.R. 1287.
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had merely been cohabiting. 31 A previous case had held that
such relief would not be available for a bigamist.132 The issue
was whether Michael's behavior here similarly went to the heart
of marriage and thus barred ancillary relief as a matter of law.
On this particular issue and particular facts, the court 133
found that relief was barred. The court stressed that the hus-
band's perjury, in asserting that he was legally eligible to marry,
defrauded not only the state but his wife. The court found that
Michael had been physically coy and verbally noncommunica-
tive, and that his wife had not fully understood his sex/gender
status.134 The court found that she would not have married him
if she had known his true gender.
In its larger discussion of the legal status of transsexualism,
however, the S.-T. v. J. court was far less rigid than the Corbett
court. It discussed the cases subsequent to Corbett in the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights 35 and in other jurisdictions. The
S.-T. v. J. court also discussed a paper by Dr. Gooren on biologi-
cal aspects of transsexualism 136 and quoted at length from a New
Zealand case which allowed a fully transitioned transsexual to
marry as a member of his new sex. 137 Society
131. The wife came from wealth and had supplied the funds for the marital
home; it appears that absent such relief the husband would be left near-destitute.
Other proceedings had dealt with the extent to which he would be permitted contin-
ued contact with the children. Id. at 1287.
132. See Whiston v. Whiston [1995] 3 W.L.R. 405.
133. For convenience sake, I use the term "the court" to refer to the primary
opinion by Ward, L.J. The concurring opinions by Potter and Neill are discussed
briefly infra.
134. Although the court accepts this finding by the trial court, it does note how it
is "astonishing that there was no single occasion in 17 years of life together when her
eyes did not see, or her hands or her body feel, or her senses tell her that she was
living with a man who had the genital formation of a woman, a man who did not
simply have a small or deformed penis, but had no penis at all." S.-T. v. J. [1997] 3
W.L.R. at 1313.
135. Although those cases have not found it a violation of the convention to deny
transsexuals the right to marry in their new sex, the judges of the European Court of
Human Rights have been skeptical of the rigidity displayed in Corbett. See Case of
X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1997) (finding that a couple,
one of whom is transsexual, and their child born through artificial insemination, are
a family unit); Rees v. United Kingdom 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1987). Recently,
the European Court of Justice held that transsexuals were protected by the rules
against sex discrimination in employment. See Case 13/94 P. v. S. and Cornwall
County Council E.C.R. 2519 (1996).
136. The paper was approved in 1993 by the European Committee on Legal Co-
Operation at the Council of Europe. See S.-T. v. J. 3 W.L.R. at 1306.
137. See id. at 1302-03 (quoting M. v. M. (unreported) 30 May 1991, S. Ct. of
NZ).
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ought.., to allow such persons to function as fully as possible
in their reassigned sex, and this must include the capacity to
marry. Where two persons present themselves as having the
apparent genitals of a man and a woman, they should not have
to establish that each can function sexually. 13
8
The New Zealand court then noted that the alternative would be
more disturbing. If a MTF was deemed still male, she could
marry a woman, in what would to all outward appearances be a
same-sex marriage. 139 In effect, S.-T. v. J. suggests that courts
should approve seemingly heterosexual same-sex marriages, such
as those of Arthur Corbett and Ashley Corbett, rather than gay
or lesbian same-sex marriages as might exist if Ashley had mar-
ried a genetic female.
The judges in S.-T. v. J. did not need to decide this question
or the validity of Corbett, however, since Michael had not under-
gone the "surgical construction of a penis.' 140 For almost two
decades, the husband and wife had sex with a dildo. Although
this would have been irrelevant if the husband had been supple-
menting a too-small penis, as the wife said she believed, it was
determinative when it was the only penis.
The husband's perjury regarding his gender went to the
heart of the marriage relationship, since it related to "a quintes-
sential element of capacity.' 141 The court noted that not all per-
jury was so serious. For example, lies about one's prior marital
history would not bar relief. 42 The court suggested, however,
that postoperative transsexuals might legitimately claim to be
their new sex. The British marriage statute provides that a mar-
riage is void if "the parties are not respectively male and fe-
male, ' '143 but that language could, in the light of advancing
medical knowledge, be reconceptualized to "place greater em-
phasis on gender than on sex in deciding whether a person is to
be regarded as male or female."'1
44
Judge Ward's openness to the possibility of a legal hetero-
sexual marriage between, say, a FTM and a woman is of course,
dicta. Furthermore, this openness is not shared by the concur-
ring judges. Judge Potter in S. - T. v. J. cites Corbett approvingly
138. Id. (quoting M. v. M.)
139. See id. (quoting M. v. M.).
140. Id. at 1303.
141. Id. at 1312.
142. See id. at 1315-16.
143. Id. at 1305 (citing Matrimonial Causes Act § 11(c) [1973]).
144. Id.
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for the proposition that the criterion for determining sex "are
biological,' 145 although he suggests that they might be mutable.
A FTM "is not generally regarded as having satisfied the criteria
of masculinity unless endowed (by surgery or otherwise) with ap-
parent male genitalia."'1 46 Judge Neill would also deny relief, fo-
cusing especially on the "grave deception" practiced on the
plaintiff.147 It is thus unclear how a British court would rule to-
day in a case like Corbett, in which the marriage occurred after
full sex reassignment surgery and where the nontransgendered
spouse was aware of his/her spouse's sex change.
C. American Case Law
The American cases involving actual or contemplated
transsexual marriages generally follow a similar, though more ab-
breviated, logic to that applied in Corbett and S.-T. v. J. In
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 14 the facts are a mirror image of S.-
T. v. J. The husband sought an annulment, after discovering on
his wedding night that his bride had male sex organs, both on the
grounds that she was a man and thus could not marry another
man, and on the grounds of fraud. The Anonymous court agreed
with both arguments. The holding based solely on the wife's
fraud seems unexceptional.1 49 Whatever the limits may be to the
doctrine of annulment on the grounds of fraud going to the "es-
sentials of the marriage," it would seem that concealment of the
fact that one does not have the equipment for the kind of inter-
course one's spouse expects would qualify. 150 Yet, the Anony-
145. Id. at 1326.
146. Id.
147. Id at 1335.
148. 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971).
149. In an earlier version of this Article, I rather snidely suggested the husband
lacked a normal degree of sophistication for not discovering this fact about his fian-
cde before the wedding. That was, however, before learning of the wife in S.-T. v. J.
who apparently remained ignorant of her husband's female genitalia for seventeen
years.
150. The naivet6 or subconscious desire implicit in the action of the husband in
Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, like that of the wife in S- T. v. J., 3 W.L.R 1287, is
less extraordinary than one might imagine. It is central to the plot in David Henry
Hwang's Broadway hit, M. Butterfly, the true story of a French diplomat who falls in
love with his ideal "woman," only to discover that his amour is a male Chinese spy
cross-dressed as a woman. More recently, Bruce Jensen, a Utah Mormon married
the cross-dressing Felix Urioste, on the belief that he had gotten her pregnant. He
learned of his bride's true sex only when the police found him/her after Jensen had
filed a missing persons report. Again, annulment was the natural and available solu-
tion, although the media attention suggested that the case raised questions regarding
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mous court also held that the marriage was void simply because
the wife was a man. The court asserted that, not only was he a
man at the time of the marriage, but that even sex reassignment
surgery would not make him the requisite "true female." Mar-
riage required a true male and a true female since its purpose
was procreation. 1
51
Not long after Anonymous, a New York court in B. v. B.
152
faced the less common situation of a challenge by a wife to the
validity of her transsexual marriage to a FTM. 153 During their
courtship, Frances B., the wife, assumed Mark, the husband, was
a man, relying on his words, dress, and appearance. Upon mar-
riage she discovered Mark was incapable of normal sexual inter-
course because he "[did] not possess a normal penis, and in fact
[did] not have a penis. ' 154 Mark answered that he was a FTM
transsexual in transition. Citing both Anonymous and the gay
marriage cases of Baker v. Nelson 155 and Jones v. Hallahan,
156
the court held that marriage required one male and one female
since "the marriage relationship exists with the results and for
the purpose of begetting offspring. 1' 57 The court seemed to con-
flate incapacity to have intercourse, traditionally a ground for an-
nulment, with sterility. While one who is impotent cannot,
absent assisted reproduction, procreate, many people are potent
though sterile. They have never been deemed incapable of legal
marriage. Mark, after sex reassignment surgery, could have had
intercourse with his wife, though like many men, he could never
the sophistication and the "manhood" of the good citizens of Utah. Of course, as
Bruce's bishop explained, he was "just a little country bumpkin from Wyoming."
"Nice Guy" Amazed to Find Jailed Wife Is a Man, ARMz. DAILY STAR, July 14, 1995,
at IA, available in 1995 WL 3278081. For a fascinating fictional portrait of a
transsexual, suggesting psychologically compelling reasons why the girls with whom
he was involved might want to understand the central character as a man, despite his
lack of genitalia, see DINITIA SMITH, THE ILLUSIONIST (1997) (novel based on the
case of Brandon Teena, a young FTM drifter murdered by jealous local teenage
boys).
151. See Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500-01.
152. 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1974).
153. Although transgender activists claim that the situation occurs as often
among anatomical females as anatomical males, every other litigated transsexual
case that appeared in research for this Article involved an MTF transsexual.
154. 355 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
155. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
156. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
157. 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717 (quoting Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605, 607 (N.Y.
1926)). See also Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1982) (indi-
cating that refusal to grant preferential immigration status to same-sex spouses
might be justified by fact that "homosexual marriages never produce offspring").
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impregnate her. The court held, however, that "[w]hile it is pos-
sible that defendant may function as a male in other situations
and in other relationships, defendant cannot function as a hus-
band by assuming male duties and obligations inherent in the
marriage relationship."
158
B. v. B. suggested that categorization of a person by sex is a
functional question and that Mark might be legally male in other
contexts. Other courts, however, have been reluctant to recog-
nize a sex change for fear that it will facilitate the transsexual's
ability to marry in his or her new sex. For example, the immedi-
ate issue before the court in In re Ladrach'59 was the MTF peti-
tioner's ability, following sex reassignment surgery, to obtain a
new birth certificate reflecting her current sex and name. The
court refused to order the bureaucracy to issue such a certificate
precisely because Ladrach planned to use that birth certificate
sex to marry "another" man.
Two American cases, one still ongoing, portend a somewhat
more hospitable legal environment for transsexuals' domestic re-
lations situations. The case of M. T. v. J. T. 160 involved a marriage
between a man, J.T., and a woman, M.T., who the husband knew
had undergone MTF sex reassignment surgery before the mar-
riage. Indeed, they began living together before the operation
and J.T. had helped pay for M.T.'s surgery. They married and
lived as husband and wife for two years, regularly engaging in
penile-vaginal intercourse. Nonetheless, when the wife sued for
divorce, the husband countered that she was a man and that the
marriage was therefore void. The MTF wife had the best possi-
ble facts for refusing to void the marriage: (1) she had fully tran-
sitioned; (2) she could and did engage in sex as a woman; and (3)
her spouse knew before the wedding that he was marrying a
transsexual. The court held the marriage valid. It assumed that
marriages are heterosexual unions between different-sex per-
sons,161 but it concluded that the wife was a woman. Unlike Cor-
bett, the M. T. v. J. T. court held that the most important criterion
for classifying a person as male or female was core gender iden-
tity, not chromosomes. The determination of sex rested on "the
158. 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
159. 513 N.E. 828 (Ohio 1987).
160. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976).
161. "[A] lawful marriage requires.., two persons of the opposite sex.... In the
matrimonial field the heterosexual union is usually regarded as the only one entitled
to legal recognition and public sanction." Id. at 207.
1998]
UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:219
dual test of anatomy and gender," which determined sexual ca-
pacity. Sexual capacity was defined as "the coalescence of both
the physical ability and the psychological and emotional orienta-
tion to engage in sexual intercourse as either a male or a fe-
male."'1 62 Under this test, M.T. was a female and her marriage to
a male was therefore valid.
In one sense, M.T. splits the interests of gays and lesbians
from those of heterosexual transsexuals, since it assumes that
heterosexual sexual intercourse is the defining marital act. The
case, however, provides a step forward from Corbett and Anony-
mous by deheterosexualizing marriage and exploding the confla-
tion of sex, gender, and sexual orientation. M. T. implicitly
rejects procreation as the necessary purpose of marriage; instead
it views the core meaning of the marital relationship as inter-
course and intimacy. Procreation excludes gay and lesbian rela-
tionships by definition. While gays and lesbians can and do
procreate, they can never be genetic coparents. In contrast,
intimacy and intercourse - at least if the latter is not narrowly
limited to penile-vaginal forms of erotic intimacy - are as de-
scriptive of gay and lesbian relationships as of heterosexual
ones. 163
The most recent case involving a transsexual marriage is
Vecchione v. Vecchione,164 filed in Orange County, California in
1996. Joshua Vecchione, a FTM transsexual, underwent sex reas-
signment surgery nearly twenty years ago. He changed legal doc-
uments, to the extent possible, to reflect his current name and
sex, but New York, where he was born, does not permit a change
of sex on birth certificates. In 1990, Joshua married a woman,
Kristie. They had a daughter by artificial insemination with the
spermf of Joshua's brother. In 1996, Kristie filed for divorce and,
shortly thereafter, amended her petition seeking to declare the
marriage null and void. She and her attorney, a conservative ac-
tivist, claimed that the marriage was never valid because Joshua
was, and always would be, female and that as a female he could
not legally marry another female. If such a petition were
162. Id. at 209.
163. Cf. Smith, supra note 118, at 1008 (describing the essential role of spouse as
including the ability to engage in intercourse and "the ability to love and understand
another" and concluding that a "marriage, transsexual or otherwise, should not be
declared [void] unless it is apparent that the marriage never existed in the minds of
the parties themselves"). This unassailable sentiment makes sexual orientation as
irrelevant to the legitimacy of marriage as sex at birth.
164. No. 95D003769 (Orange County filed April 23, 1996).
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granted, Joshua would be denied parental rights to his child. Cal-
ifornia law recognizes the husband as the legal father when a
child is conceived through artificial insemination of a married
woman with the husband's concurrence - as occurred in this
case. 165 However, if Joshua were not the husband, and also not
the genetic father, he would be a legal stranger to his daughter
and the wife could cut off any continuing relationship between
Joshua and the child.
166
The wife argued that a person's sex is determined by his or
her chromosomes at birth and cannot be changed thereafter.
Appearance, gender identity, and gender roles are all irrelevant.
"[O]ne cannot change one's gender by merely changing clothes,
receiving hormone injections, and applying makeup. ' 167 The sur-
gery which removed his external female sex characteristics and
constructed a penis was dismissed as merely "cosmetic
surgery. "168
While the briefs primarily assert that gender is a matter of
chromosomes, a declaration by the wife-petitioner suggests one
rationale for not recognizing Joshua as a true male. His surgery
could not create a fully operational male organ. The organ "cer-
tainly does not appear to be a penis, nor does it function like one.
It is continually flaccid" and can only function for intercourse
with the assistance of a splint-like support.169
These arguments build on a conception of gender which is
both rigid and rigidly dichotomous. One is what one is; any at-
tempt to be anything else is a form of fraud on the universe.
170
165. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West 1998).
166. Cf. Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597 (1990); Nancy S. v. Michele G.,
228 Cal. App. 3d 831 (1991) (denying the nonbiological lesbian comother legal rights
to visitation with child).
167. Points and Authorities in support of Petitioner's Notice of Motion for a
Blood Test at 4, Vecchione, No. 95D003T69.
168. Id. at 8. This seems not only conceptually absurd but legally wrong, since
California had previously recognized that sex reassignment surgery did not fall
within the "cosmetic surgery" exception to eligibility for Medi-Cal funding. See
G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 71 (1978). Compare the comments of the trial
judge in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 581 F. Supp. 821, 826 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("I do not
know what it would take to convince defendant that a person who undergoes so
radical a procedure.., knowing all of the dangers and all of the trouble that it would
and might involve, did not do it for some ulterior purpose.").
169. Declaration of Petitioner in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement at
2-3, Vecchione, No. 95D003769.
170. The attorney provides a numbered list of steps on the slippery slope that he
feels we would be on if Joshua's sex change were recognized, including such sugges-
tions as that a Caucasian could become black and obtain the benefits of affirmative
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As one of the briefs argues, it would "emasculate[ ] all vestiges of
legal reasoning" to find that someone could, by hormones and
surgery, "alter father nature's plan" and change from a woman to
a man. 1
71
Fortunately, the petition to annul the marriage failed. The
Vecchione court noted that a California statute recognized the
validity of one's post-operative sex by providing for a change of
gender designation on California birth certificates following sex
reassignment surgery.172 Citing this statute, the court held that
"the post operative genital anatomy of Mr. Vecchione is male
except that he is sterile and unable to conceive children." 173
In summary, the transsexual marriage cases show courts
struggling to categorize the defendants as male or female in or-
der to decide if their marriages were valid. The courts agree that
the nontranssexual partner is entitled to know what he or she is
getting into, and that fraud or concealment of transsexual status
are grounds to declare the marriage void. They similarly seem to
agree that a person cannot marry as a member of his or her new
sex before completing sex reassignment surgery - a man must
have a penis and a woman cannot have one. The cases are least
coherent and consistent when the courts are faced with deciding
the sex of a postoperative transsexual. He or she appears to be a
member of the new sex and can have what by all appearances is
penile-vaginal intercourse, but is sterile. The courts cannot agree
if such a person can perform "the essential role" of a man or
woman. They cannot agree, I suggest, because they cannot de-
action "by modifying the color of his or her skin," that a noncustodial father could
avoid further child support by undergoing a sex change operation and claiming that
as a woman he "is no longer the father," and that a 50.year-old, by dyeing his hair
white and delusionally believing himself to be 70, could "qualify for Medicare."
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment for Entry
of Nullity of Marriage at 11-12, Vecchione, No. 95D003769. The suggestion that a
person could avoid parental support obligations by a claim of transsexual status was
specifically rejected in Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1985), which found
a FFM to be the legal father and thus responsible for the support of the children
produced by the artificial insemination of his wife.
171. Memorandum of Points of Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgement for Entry of Nullity of Marriage at 8, Vecchione, No. 95D003769.
172. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103425 (West 1998).
173. Minute Order at X, Vecchione, No. 95D003769. The court denied summary
judgment on the question of whether the marriage was based on fraud. The wife's
various declarations seem to assert that the husband both informed her of the
transsexual status and claimed that he had functioning testicles that produced sperm.
Id. This, like the facts of other cases reviewed herein, suggests that high school sex
education has had quite a limited effect on knowledge as well as sexual behavior.
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cide precisely what that essential role is. The transsexual cases
force courts to distinguish and deconstruct the multiple aspects of
sexual identity and sexual role. The psychological disorientation
evident in the opinions is apparently not conducive to the most
precise analytic reasoning.
V. TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGES AS A CHALLENGE TO THE
OBJECTIONS TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGES
No matter which strand of the opposition's argument against
same-sex marriage we consider, transgendered marriages and the
subsequent legal response undermine those arguments. Con-
sider, first, the claims of language and tradition. Marriages, it is
argued, must consist of a man and a woman because this is what
marriage means and what marriage has always meant. However,
the argument based on tradition rests on a factually faulty basis.
As Eskridge showed, relationships between persons of the same
genetic sex, that otherwise look to all the world like marriage, are
recognized in a variety of cultures. In a number of African socie-
ties, powerful and wealthy women took wives. 174 In certain Na-
tive American cultures, berdaches - biological males who
dressed and took on roles highly similar to women's - served as
wives to male husbands.175 These situations did not involve
transsexuals in the modern gense of persons who have surgically
changed their anatomy. Rather they involved a marriage-like re-
lationship between two people of the same anatomical sex but of
different genders. In that sense, these relationships could be
cited as predecessors to either a modern transsexual heterosexual
relationship or a gay or lesbian marriage. Clearly, however, they
show that-one cannot view marriage as an unbroken tradition
solely of two-gendered, different-sex, heterosexual pairings.176
Within American culture there have also been marriages
that do not-fit the traditional model in Euro-American society,
although their nonconformity has been largely invisible. In addi-
tion to the transgender relationships revealed in the litigated
cases above and in my survey, there are occasional stories of
174. See _SKRIDGE, supra note 56, at 33-35.
175. See id. at 27-31; see also CALIFIA, supra note 114, at 130-35.
176. As Nancy Polikoff has stressed, these relationships do not challenge the pa-
triarchal, gendered nature of marriage and thus raise doubts whether gay marriage
would similarly mean the domestication of gay life more than the liberation of mar-
riage. See Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay
and Lesbian Marriage Will Not Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every
Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993).
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marriages whose transgressive nature is revealed only by acci-
dent. 177 For example, jazz player Billy Tipton was assumed by
fans, neighbors - even, apparently, by his three wives and his
children - to be a man until it was discovered upon his death
that he was a woman who spent her life passing as a man.
178
Such marriages, during their hidden existence, do not challenge
the presumptions of the same-sex marriage opponents. They
demonstrate, however, that what appear to be good, traditional
marriages may secretly house transgressive relationships. Like
Trojan horses, these camouflaged relationships contain a differ-
ent vision of marriage. Knowledge of these relationships shatters
the complacency built into claims rooted in definition or
tradition.
The argument based on traditional definitions of marriage is
also vulnerable because it assumes that the dictionary can cap-
ture reality. Marriage is a humanly constructed institution and
can, at least in theory, obey the rules of the dictionary. But a
definition of marriage as one man and one woman assumes that
the terms "man" and "woman" are sufficiently clear and stable to
serve as building blocks. Biology, however, increasingly shows
that defining sex/gender is not so simple. There are anatomically
intersexed persons, sometimes called hermaphrodites, whose
genitalia at birth are not clearly male or female. There are also
persons whose chromosomal makeup is neither XX nor XY. Fi-
nally, there are transsexuals whose physical characteristics con-
flict with their psychological gender identity and social gender
role. Neither Webster's nor Black's Law Dictionary can tell us
how to categorize such persons or whom they should be permit-
ted to marry.
179
Courts that have been faced by challenges to transsexual
marriages, like the opponents of same-sex marriage, have gener-
ally assumed that marriage is valid only if there are two different-
177. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 56, at 37-39, 42-44.
178. See James Christopher, The Lady Was a Jazzman, TIMES LONDON, Nov. 11,
1997, available in 1997 WL 9242159.
179. On the complexity of sex/gender, see generally, KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER
OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN AND THE REST OF Us 72-73 (1994); ANNE FAUSTO-
STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES ABOUT MEN AND WOMEN
(1985). On the significance of these ambiguities and complexities for the same-sex
marriage question, see MARK PHILIP STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MAR-
RIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1997); David Berreby, Quelle Difference? Biology
Will Defeat the Defense of Marriage Act, SLATE (Sept. 10, 1996) <http://
www.slate.com/Concept/96-09-10/Concept.asp>.
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sex parties.180 They also have generally assumed that this is a
question of fact which the courts are qualified to determine. 181
The differences among the various opinions have largely re-
flected differences in the underlying assumption of the relevant
criteria. Some assume that sex has a true essence. The facts in
the transsexual marriage cases make it impossible for the courts
to take the simplistic positions of gay marriage cases like Jones v.
Hallahan or commentators like Robert Knight. The opinions in
the transsexual marriage cases still assume that every person has
a discoverable, true sex. For Corbett, the key criteria were chro-
mosomes, gonads, and genitals; sex is thus unchangeable. For
J. T. v. M. T., the key criteria were external genital anatomy and
core gender identity; sex could then theoretically be changed.
Other courts explicitly indicated that the criteria are functional.
For example, B. v. B. said that B's lack of a penis meant that he
could not be a husband, but suggested he might be male for other
purposes.
When deciding how to determine if X is a man or a woman,
and thus if X can be a husband or a wife, a court must have some
vision of what it means to be a husband or a wife. As Corbett
notes, there are a number of different possible criteria. 182 The
essence of transgenderism is the recognition that for some people
these are inconsistent. The choice of which criteria count must
reflect some notion of which are "true," or perhaps more
pragmatically, which criteria will be allowed to matter. 18
3
180. Sometimes this rule has been embodied in the relevant statute, as in S.-T. v.
J., [1997] 3 W.L.R. 1287. In other cases, such as Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325
N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971), it seems merely to have been assumed.
181. Arguably, the Vecchione court found that the legislature had already set out
the criteria for sex. Joshua was male because he had met the requirements for ob-
taining a change of sex designation on his birth certificate, had he been born in
California. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 103425 (West 1998).
182. The list in the case includes: (i) Chromosomal factors, (ii) Gonadal factors
(i.e., the presence or absence of testes or ovaries), (iii) Genital factors (including
internal sex organs), (iv) Psychological factors, and (v) Hormonal factors or secon-
dary sexual characteristics (such as distribution of hair, breast development, phy-
sique, etc. which are thought to reflect the balance between the male and female sex
hormones in the body). See Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, 44.
183. No court has held any single criterion to be determinative. Even Corbett,
which has been seen as resting on chromosomes, also refers to gonads and genitals in
the criteria it rests its decision upon. In the case before it, it would appear that April
had a vagina and did not have a penis, which would make her female by the criterion
of genitals. The court evaded this logical inconsistency in its own analysis by simply
asserting that, given April's chromosomal maleness, the cavity between her legs
could not be a vagina. See [1970] 2 All E.R. at 49.
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In deciding which criteria are relevant, the courts in
transsexual marriage cases struggle with the same concerns as the
opponents to same-sex marriage - the relative significance to
marriage of intercourse and procreation. If, as Finnis says, true
marriage requires the unitive act of penile-genital intercourse,
1 84
then a marriage requires a person with a penis and a person with
a vagina. But, it turns out, the terms "penis" and "vagina" are as
deconstructable as "man" and "woman" or "husband" and
"wife." A penis-holding cavity between the legs is not really a
vagina if it is constructed between the legs of someone who is a
chromosomal male, says Corbett.a85 Sex with an artificial penis,
according to S.-T. v. J., is presumably acceptable if the device
supplements a deformed and useless penis, but not if it is the
only penis.18 6 But the judgement in M.T. v. J.T. held that the
husband was a man after his surgery because he had "the physi-
cal ability ... to engage in sexual intercourse" as a man.1
87
Like the opponents of same-sex marriage, the opinions in
the transsexual marriage cases sometimes read as if they need
not choose between intercourse and procreation as definitions of
marriage. Corbett's refusal to concede that a vagina can be surgi-
cally constructed seems to rest on a concern that April's cavity
led nowhere - any sperm would hit a dead end - since for
erotic purposes it was no different than a genetic woman's va-
gina. Anonymous suggested that even a postoperative MTF
might not be a marriageable woman because marriage exists "for
the purpose of begetting offspring.' 88 B. v. B. demonstrates as
well the inherent confusion between the concepts of procreation
and intercourse, for it claims that the key is Mark's inherent ste-
rility, yet relies on cases annulling marriages for impotence. 18 9
Sterility, however, has never been recognized as a ground for an-
nulment of marriages between persons with different and func-
tioning external genitalia.
184. See Finnis, supra note 46, at 1066.
185. See 2 All E.R. at 33.
186. See S.-T. v. J., [1997] 3 W.L.R. 1287. Surgeons can now construct artificial
penises that function for intercourse, although, as with certain forms of impotence,
an implanted device must be manually triggered to achieve erection. See MACKEN-
ZIE, supra note 97, at 19; Amy Bloom, The Body Lies, NEW YORKER, July 18, 1994,
at 38.
187. M.T. v. J.T, 355 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976).
188. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (1971).
189. See 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 717 (1974); See also Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500
(same confusion).
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At a fundamental level, the opposition to transgender and to
any same-sex marriage rests heavily on resistance to both gender
transgression and the appearance of such transgression. What
makes the marriages problematic is not merely who the parties
are but who they appear to be. The distinction between reality
and perception - or more precisely between perceptions rooted
in various visions of sex and gender - can occur at two levels.
First, there may be a fraud or misperception between the parties.
Second, there may be a "fraud on the public."1 90 While the first
raises legitimate ethical concerns, the second reveals the inherent
falseness of the beliefs about both gender and marriage that are
disrupted by such relationships.
In a number of the litigated cases, the spouses claimed igno-
rance of the transsexual status of the persons they were marrying
until some time after the wedding. Deception as to one's sexual
identity, if proven, is surely an appropriate grounds for an annul-
ment. Marriage is, in large part, about a gendered eroticism and
the desire to engage in certain sexual acts within a socially ap-
proved institution. One is surely entitled to know that one's
partner is incapable of engaging in such acts or can do so only
with the help of an artificial aid.191 Even if one partner is a post-
operative transsexual fully capable of engaging in penile-vaginal
intercourse, that fact is something the other partner is entitled to
know. Transsexuals are unable to procreate. While sterility itself
is not a ground for annulment, the possibility of children is suffi-
ciently important to many, that fraudulent concealment of steril-
ity frequently is.192 The cases suggest that there is a legal
190. The concept of "fraud on the public" has been particularly evident in the
context of petitions for a change of name. See, e.g., In re Dengler, 246 N.W.2d 758,
761 (N.D. 1976); Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 385 A.2d 120, 122 (N.H. 1978); In re
Fermer, 685 A.2d 78, 81 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996). M. T. v. J. T rejected the argument
that the concept should extend to marriages of a transsexual in her post-operative
gender, stating that the assumption of that new gender was rather, the "removal of a
false faqade." 355 A.2d at 209.
191. Annulment seems entirely appropriate, for example, in a situation like that
in Anonymous where the husband claims that he woke up the day after the wedding
and "discovered that the defendant had male sex organs." He then left and they
never had sexual relationships or lived together. It seems much less apt for the wife
in S.-T. v. J. who claims to have only discovered her husband's sexual identity by a
document search after seventeen years of marriage and two children.
192. See, e.g., Kronman v. Kronman, 286 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1956); Stegienko v. Ste-
gienko, 295 Mich. 530 (1940). By contrast, inability to engage in intercourse, but not
inability to have children, is grounds for an annulment. See Stepanek v. Stepanek,
193 Cal. App. 2d 760, 762 (1961) (defining the test of physical inability as "inability
for copulation, not fruitfulness").
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obligation in at least some jurisdictions to inform one's partner
before marriage that one is transsexual; certainly there is an ethi-
cal obligation to do so.
A marriage, freely and knowingly entered into, should not
be void, however, because the state believes the spouses cannot
marry each other. The finding that marriages must be between
different-sex parties is precisely such a rule, denying marriage to
some who seek it. Even where the parties are aware of the sex-
ual identity of their partners, the marriage is void because it does
not fall within the legally cognizable bounds of marriage. Laws
like the Defense of Marriage Act' 93 and the holdings of cases like
Corbett'94 permit one of the parties to such a marriage to use the
law strategically to avoid marital obligations they willingly and
knowingly accepted. This strategy is similar to the practice of
some lesbian biological mothers who have sought to deny the le-
gitimacy of their past relationships in order to block their
comother from continued access to their child.195 These statutes
and cases would apparently also permit a transgender marriage
to be ignored or challenged by third parties, such as parents, chil-
dren of a prior marriage, insurance companies, or tortfeasors
who might benefit legally if the marriage did not exist.
The opposition to transgender and same-sex marriages is
based, in part, on a felt need to reserve the status of marriage for
couplings between male husbands and female wives. The value
of the institution of marriage is eroded if it is made available to
others. Those who are uncertain of their sexual orientation may
be more inclined to form a homosexual union deemed less desir-
able, if this does not mean giving up on the dream of being mar-
ried. Even the solidly heterosexual may be less inclined to marry
if the institution does not carry the status that derives from its
exclusively heterosexual nature.
How will these harms occur? The population will know that
gays and lesbians are marrying because they will see them in
married couples. With the right to marry, gay and lesbian
couples will be more open and blatant. They will invade public
spaces in apparently intimate pairings, wearing matching wed-
ding bands. Knowing that someone is married, as Posner argues,
193. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1997)).
194. [1970] 2 All E.R. 33.
195. See, e.g., In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 7 N.Y.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1991).
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will no longer tell you the sex of their spouse or (if it ever did
with certainty) the person's sexual orientation.
196
In one sense, the sorts of transsexual marriages that reach
the courts seem to provide little challenge to this enforced vision
of the marital world as bi-gendered and heterosexual. They all
involve a transsexual with a core gender identity and appearance
of one sex and a partner of the other. However, transsexual mar-
riages demonstrate that appearances can be deceiving. For ex-
ample, consider a man who is married to a MTF who was born
male. The wife still has male chromosomes, male internal or-
gans; and she cannot produce eggs. She may not have a fully
functioning vagina, indeed, she may not have a vagina at all. If
such a person can be considered a woman, and a man can choose
to marry her, it is not a big step for a man to marry a drag queen
- where both parties understand themselves to be two men and
their sexual relationship to be homoerotic although one has the
gender presentation of a woman. In effect, transgender folks, by
breaching the wall of gender dichotomy, demonstrate that heter-
osexual marriages and gay or lesbian marriages are points on a
continuum, not two entirely distinct institutions.
Yet, if the courts were to enforce strict adherence to the
chromosomal gender definition, they would find themselves on
the other horn of the dilemma. This view assumes that a MTF is
and remains a male, regardless of appearance, core gender iden-
tity, hormones, breasts, or surgically constructed vagina. Her
marriage to a male is void. Logically, then, she must be able to
marry a woman (because the birth certificates would indicate the
requisite two sexes), even though this would appear to be a
same-sex marriage.
This is the irony of the ruling in In re Ladrach, 197 which was
designed to insure that a MTF transsexual could not change her
birth certificate and marry a genetic man. Because she was still
legally a man, then, she could marry a woman. In effect, the
legal rules designed to prevent same-sex marriages, would forbid
postoperative transsexuals from entering into what appears to be
a different-sex heterosexual marriage. Those same rules would
effectively authorize granting them a license to enter into what
196. See POSNER, supra note 58, at 312.
197. 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).
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would appear to be, and what they and their partners would un-
derstand to be, marriages between two men or two women. 198
Such apparently same-sex, transgender marriages now exist.
The litigated cases all involve post-transition marriages. Yet, as
the survey shows, some people marry first and later come to un-
derstand themselves as transsexual. Some then undergo sex reas-
signment surgery. If the partner remains married to the
transsexual, the marriage between two people born of different
sexes (or a woman and a MTF) is now to all appearances a mar-
riage between, say, a man and a FTM transsexual. While I am
unaware of any case challenging the validity of such a marriage,
some transsexuals and their partners are concerned that the
flurry of post-Baehr legislation makes their marriages vulnerable
to annulment. At least one person in the survey has declined to
change his birth certificate to minimize such danger. 199
One possible outcome is that unlike the rest of us, transsexu-
als, at a certain stage, have the freedom to marry a partner of
either sex. Consider a genetic male planning to have a sex
change operation. If the pre-operative MTF wants to marry a
genetic female, she can, in most jurisdictions, marry her because
the birth certificates will indicate she is a man marrying a wo-
man.200 Despite the trepidation of some of my respondents, the
198. See Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Conn. 1975) (remanding the
issue of whether a postoperative transsexual could obtain a change of birth certifi-
cate. The court noted that a failure to allow the change might be impermissible, in
part, because it could infringe on the petitioner's fundamental right to marry.). As
one commentator noted, to prohibit the transsexual from marrying in his or her new
sex "might deprive the sexually reassigned individual of the ability to maintain a
legal heterosexual relationship, forcing the transsexual to choose between celibacy
and illegality." Note, Transsexuals in Limbo: The Search for a Legal Definition of
Sex, 31 MD. L. REV. 236, 247 (1971). Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL
694235, (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), of course, provides another way to resolve the
celibacy/illegitimacy dilemma. The ultimate goal of such reform, however, is to per-
mit everyone, including the transsexual in his/her new sex, to marry a person of
whatever sex he/she chooses.
199. In effect, such marriages are same-sex, but not homosexual. Opponents of
some same-sex marriages falsely deny that such a relationship can exist. See, e.g.,
Defendants Reply Brief at 5, Baehr, 1996 WL 694235 (asserting that if a lesbian
changed her sexual orientation she "would by definition no long wish to marry the
person she currently loves because that person is the same sex she is"). How, then,
can you explain the heterosexual female partners of my MTF respondents who re-
main married to their now same-sex husbands?
200. Compare the case of Lori Michelle Buckwalter. According to news reports,
she is taking hormones and planning sex reassignment surgery, which will make her
anatomically female. "[S]ince he legally remains a man until then, Buckwalter is
free to marry Sharon Contreras today." Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 14, 1996. A similar
case involving the marriage of a MTF prior to her surgery, to the woman she loved,
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later surgery is not likely to void an existing different-sex mar-
riage. Conversely, if she wants to marry a genetic male, she can
have the surgery first, then either have the birth certificate
changed in states that allow it, or apply for a marriage license,
using her driver's license and her female persona to marry him.
My survey respondents include people who have entered into
both sorts of marriages. A rule that would forbid this freedom to
transsexuals by requiring a fixed sex would limit the right to
marry to persons who could pass a biological test of "proper" sex
identity. Such a rule would deny intersexuals, and those such as
S.-T., who cannot be securely classified as one sex or the other,
the right to marry at all.
Marriage has been recognized as a fundamental right under
the Constitution. 201 States cannot deny the right to marry even
to those who do not pay their child support20 2 or to those in
prison.203 A rule limiting marriage to those whose sex/gender
status is unambiguous would be the most extreme form of depri-
vation of the right to marry. Rules proscribing incest, polygamy,
or gay marriage deny the affected persons the right to marry par-
ticular other persons. Those whose gender status is ambiguous,
even for reasons beyond their control, could never marry
anyone.
VI. CONCLUSION
An honest consideration of transgendered people and their
relationships explodes the secure sense of fixed categories on
which the opposition to same-sex marriages rests. The opposi-
tion clings to the fixed categories like a drowning man clings to a
life raft in a sea of postmodern complexity and dissolving bound-
aries. If transsexuals can and do marry, then the meanings of
marriage, husband and wife, and man and woman are necessarily
fluid, complex, and socially constructed.20 4 These categories are
no more fixed and natural than heterosexuality.
occurred more recently in Canada. Canadian Press report, in e-mail posting, Nov. 7,
1997 (on file with author).
201. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to . . .
happiness.").
202., See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
203. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
204. Conservatives seem to find same-sex sexual orientation to be a choice and
unnatural; their own heterosexual desires are presumed inborn and natural. In real-
ity, all sexual desire, like all sexual identity, is partly chosen, although generally ex-
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Marriage is a relationship between two people who choose
intimacy and commitment regardless of their gender appearance,
their gender roles, or their current genitalia. Such a concept lib-
erates transgendered people. It liberates gays and lesbians. It
also liberates women. By breaking the perceived naturalism of
the link between sex and gender, transgender relationships dis-
rupt the gendered patriarchy on which traditional marriage rests.
In an era in which the Promise Keeper movement promises to
put women back on the pedestal and back into the cage from
which they emerged a generation ago, alternative models of mar-
riage are sorely needed. 20 5 As transsexual marriages in all their
glorious variety become more public, the conservative's rigid
boundaries will be eroded, and we will all share the same free-
dom to marry.
perienced as immutable. All are equally natural, rather than perverse, but also
socially constructed. On the gendered roots of the opposition to same-sex relation-
ships, see generally JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE
LIMITS OF "SEX" (1993); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and
Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105
YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Franke, supra note 6; Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes,
and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orien-
tation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995). On the rela-
tionship between opposition to same-sex marriage and demands for traditional
gender roles, see, for example, Fajer, supra note 87; Koppelman, supra note 87; Law,
supra note 87.
205. A freely chosen relationship involving roles of submission and dominance is
as permissible in our liberal polity when taken on by two committed Christians as by
a strict butch and femme. But the Promise Keepers seem to suggest a man's obliga-
tion to take back the leadership of the family, regardless of the wife's wishes in the
matter.
